

# **Who Gives to International Charity: A Profile of Individual Donors in the USA**

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As the candidate's supervisor I have approved this short dissertation for submission.  
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## **Abstract**

A small proportion of American charitable donors give to international causes. Aid to developing countries constitutes a large part of this charitable sector. By studying donors who make contributions to causes outside the US, we may better understand the factors which shape public concern for global poverty and inequality, and which influence the will for redistribution. While a substantial amount of research has investigated the determinants of overall giving in the US, little is known about the determinants of giving to specific causes, especially international causes. With the data set, "Giving and Volunteering in the United States 2001," this study uses econometric regression analysis to estimate the predictors of giving to international causes and compares them to the determinants of giving to other causes such as health, education and the arts. My main hypothesis is that educational and religious institutions influence people to identify with and donate to individuals and causes in the developing world. This is based on the theory in altruism studies that people behave prosocially when they identify others' interests as indistinct from their own. The results of econometric analysis support the idea that education and religiosity are significant predictors of giving to international causes, but suggest that other mechanisms are more influential. Of the predictors included in the regression model, youth volunteering has the largest effect on the likelihood that someone gives internationally, both compared to other predictors in the model, and compared to the effect of youth volunteering on giving to other causes. The size and significance of the effect of each variable vary by cause, confirming that there are unique determinants for giving to different charitable sectors. For giving to international causes, the results suggest that being foreign born, having volunteered in one's youth, belonging to a non-religious group, attending religious services frequently and having a four-year college degree or more are all significant factors. These variables may represent mechanisms for identification, as well as other factors that motivate charitable giving such as individual personality characteristics.

## **Declaration**

I, Anna Erickson, declare that:

(i) This dissertation is a secondary analysis of an existing data source, “Giving and Volunteering USA 2001,” by the Independent Sector. The analysis is my original work, carried out at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in Durban and in Atlanta, Georgia, USA (where I permanently reside) under the supervision of Dr. Daniela Casale in the School of Development Studies.

(ii) This dissertation does not contain other persons’ data, analysis, writing or other information, unless cited and referenced as being sourced from other persons.

(iii) This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfilment of the academic requirements for the degree of Master of Development Studies in the School of Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban.

(iv) This dissertation has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.

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As the candidate’s Supervisor I have approved this dissertation for submission

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## **Chapter One: Introduction**

### **Private Charitable Giving**

Charitable giving by Americans is a powerful force shaped by individual, social, economic, and political factors. According to “Giving USA 2009,” an annual publication by the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, Americans gave privately a record-breaking \$307 billion to charity in 2008. However, adjusted for inflation, the figure shows a two percent decrease in donations compared to 2007, an unsurprising finding given the recent economic recession. As 75 percent of private donations were made by individuals (with corporations, foundations, and charitable bequests providing the remaining support) the factors associated with recession evidently affect individuals’ charitable budgets.

Yet not all philanthropic sectors saw reduced donations in 2008. While charities supporting the arts, education, the environment, health, human services and community foundations experienced a decline in private funding in 2008, support for non-profit organizations in the religious, public-societal benefit, and international sectors grew (Giving USA 2009)<sup>1</sup>. Thus, there may be distinct factors - connected to, or regardless of, economic conditions - which influence people to give to certain types of organizations. The purpose of this study is to identify the factors which shape an individual’s preference for giving to international causes, specifically to international charities which address poverty and inequality in the ‘developing world.’

### **Private Giving to International Development**

The category “international causes” implies a broad range of charitable organizations. However, Kerlin and Reid (2006) find that the majority of international donations belong specifically to the category “development and assistance” - 73 percent of the 5,600 international organizations they study and 89 percent of total international donations are designated for programs in the developing world. The remainder of organizations and

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<sup>1</sup> Public-societal benefit refers to combined funds like the United Way, policy institutions, social-science research and social advocacy organizations (Giving USA 2008). The international category includes “relief, direct aid, exchange, and other programs focused on international issues” (Giving USA 2009).

donations are shared between two other subcategories: “international understanding” (including study abroad programs) and “international affairs” (national political interests)<sup>2</sup>.

Taken together, international non-profit organizations in all three areas comprise a growing charitable sector. Still, total donations remain relatively small compared to other areas of giving such as education, health, religion, and public-societal benefit. In 2000, total donations to international causes were just over one percent of the total private donations in the US, the smallest of all sectors (Giving USA 2001). By 2008, that proportion had grown to four percent, but only outranked giving to the environment (Giving USA 2009). Essentially, Americans are much more likely to give to domestic than international causes. Put another way, Americans give more to education (*or* health, *or* public-societal benefit) in the US alone, than to education, health, *and* public-societal benefit in all other countries combined<sup>3</sup>.

The typical American donor’s preference for domestic charity is not surprising. Donors may more readily understand and feel equipped to address local needs. A nearby Boys and Girls Club is more familiar than a latrine-building project in El Salvador, for example. Donors may also be influenced by the personal benefits of their local donations. Supporting an after school program at the Boys and Girls Club might garner a donor praise from the community for being a good neighbor and decrease the number of unsupervised teenagers on the streets. The rewards for funding new latrines in a remote area of El Salvador are less conspicuous.

However, as states have rolled back provisions in the last three decades - and as globalization has made neighbors out of former strangers - individuals in the ‘developed’ world have taken on more responsibility for funding poverty reduction and economic growth in the developing world. Indeed, international philanthropy is growing in America (Okten and Osili 2007; Hudson Institute 2008).

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<sup>2</sup> Throughout this dissertation, I use the terms “international charities, organizations and causes” interchangeably to refer to the international charitable sub-sector, taken as a whole. As Kerlin and Reid (2006) suggest, the majority of organizations comprising this sub-sector are oriented toward development and assistance, but I only use the term “international development” to refer specifically to donations designated for programs in the developing world.

<sup>3</sup> Private donations reflect - and perhaps even shape - the government's spending priorities: total US Official Development Assistance (ODA) ranks at the top of countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), but in terms of the budget percentage for assistance, the US ranks above only Greece (The Hudson Institute 2007; Okten and Osili 2007).



What can we learn about the small, yet growing number of Americans who give to international charities? Discerning the factors which influence them to give is a potentially gainful endeavor, not only for fundraisers in the international sector (Rose-Ackerman 1996), but for anyone interested in predicting the effects of economic crises, tax policies and changes in the government's international aid budget on private donations. Furthermore, we might also better understand how some individuals come to conceptually and behaviorally support global redistribution. Atkinson (2007: 1) makes the astute observation that giving to international charity "is one of the few direct ways in which individuals reveal information relevant to the properties of the social welfare function to be applied to global redistribution." Many Americans may agree that global poverty and inequality are problematic. Some may act on their concern by voting for politicians who espouse similar convictions or by purchasing fair-trade goods. Few choose to donate some of their own money to relevant international charitable organizations<sup>4</sup>.

### ***Is Private Charity Helpful***

While it may be safe to say categorically that the will for international redistribution is a good thing, private aid as the medium for redistribution is problematic in many regards. Not only is it insufficient to substantively fight global poverty and inequality, but in general, private aid is by no means inherently more capable than public aid of addressing global disparity and its consequences. Difficulties with public aid - formally called "Official Development Assistance" - such as rent-seeking, bureaucratic inefficiency, and conditionality, translate to high transfer costs and more conditionality in the private sector. Furthermore, the vast number of donors and the multitude of international non-governmental organizations lead to a confusing and potentially counter-productive nebula of donor agendas. Scholte (2003) notes that when uninformed donors support popular initiatives like "adopt a child" programs in developing countries, they may unknowingly increase inequality within recipient communities.

### **The Purpose of this Study**

Informed and helpful or not, private donors to international causes provide a significant source of assistance to developing countries. The purpose of this study is to learn about the

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<sup>4</sup> Granted, donors may itemize their gifts on tax returns to receive tax breaks and decrease the cost of giving. Nevertheless, their donations reflect their will to redistribute resources from the US to other countries.

donor base for international causes. By analyzing the impact of factors - such as gender, age, education, religion, and income - on the probability of giving, I attempt to identify what leads people to be concerned about and committed to global issues compared to other causes. In popular discourse, the typical explanation is limited to income: most Americans are internally focused and choose to spend their limited resources domestically, while the rich and/or famous can afford what is considered in the US to be the luxury of giving to international causes. The high visibility of donors like Bill and Melinda Gates, Warren Buffet, Oprah Winfrey, Ted Turner, Angelina Jolie and Brad Pitt may skew perceptions about the determinants of giving internationally. But what about the non-celebrity or less-wealthy Americans who choose to give to international causes? Do they have a unique set of characteristics compared to those who give only to domestic causes?

Common sense provides some rather obvious answers. People who have traveled or have lived outside the US - especially in places where they might have seen great suffering and need - may be more inclined to give to international causes. People who pay attention to world news reports and who read articles and books on various related topics are more informed on global issues, and therefore may be more committed to help. Conversely, the more informed people are, the less confident they may be that they *can* help.

### ***Study Design and Main Hypotheses***

To explore these ideas and enrich the conversation, in this dissertation I explore the determinants of giving to international causes compared to other causes in the US, drawing on the large body of literature that has examined the determinants of giving in the US and elsewhere. For these purposes, I employ the data set “Giving and Volunteering in the United States 2001,” produced by the Independent Sector, a private, non-partisan coalition of charitable organizations in the US and leader in philanthropic research, based in Washington, DC. The data consists of a wide and relevant range of demographic, attitudinal and behavioral variables collected with the intent purpose of studying philanthropy among American individuals. I make use of both descriptive and econometric techniques to explore the question, “who gives to international charities compared to other causes?” My hypothesis is that income is not the only significant predictor of giving to international charities by

Americans. In particular, I am interested in the effect of education and religion on the probability of giving internationally.

Research shows that in the US, religious affiliation and practice significantly impact giving more generally (see Bekkers and Wiepking 2007 for a review of the literature). But how does religiosity affect giving to different causes such as international development<sup>5</sup>? The last two decades have seen a growing concern and solidarity among religious bodies to address global poverty and inequality; the Jubilee 2000 initiative for debt cancellation in developing countries and the ONE campaign against extreme poverty are well-known examples. In 2005, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops organized The Catholic Campaign Against Global Poverty to support effective US trade policies, long-term development programs, and debt cancellations for poor countries (Catholic Relief Services 2009). In 2006, at the triennial General Convention of the Episcopal Church, USA, delegates made the Millennium Development Goals the national church's top mission priority for the 2006-2009 cycle (Episcopal Relief and Development 2009). To garner support for these and other initiatives, local religious communities may preach messages, employ curricula for weekly religious classes, and host fundraisers that explicitly encourage members to consider themselves as agents of charity recipients' physical and perhaps even spiritual well-being<sup>6</sup>. As a result of their faith-based commitment to serving people 'in need,' are religious Americans more likely to give to developing countries where poverty is deepest and need is greatest? Does religiosity affect international giving more or differently than it does other causes?

Research also shows that education positively impacts charitable giving, even after controlling for the effect of other variables (Bekkers and Wiepking 2007). But how does education affect giving to different causes? Four-year degree programs often require students to take survey courses in history, politics, economics, and sociology which may bring global disparities to students' attention, or which may simply expand their frame of reference. Undergraduate and graduate degrees in a variety of fields necessarily include international

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<sup>5</sup> By "religiosity," I mean a person's level of religiousness, or the degree to which they practice their faith by attending religious services.

<sup>6</sup> Some small-scale examples of consciousness- and fund-raising include Heifer International's "Ark" project which supplies pairs of domesticated animals to communities in developing countries - a play off of the Old Testament story, Noah's Ark, and therefore an appeal to communities in the Judeo-Christian tradition (Heifer International 2009). Similarly, Darfur awareness campaigns within Muslim communities have created opportunities for members to identify with the beneficiaries of their fundraising efforts (Muhammad 2004).

studies. Certain fields may increase students' appreciation of the interdependence of global economies. Generally, the more educated people are, the more likely they may be to read the newspaper, to listen to National Public Radio, or to read complex articles in periodicals which expose them to issues outside the US. Are well-educated Americans - who are likely to be more knowledgeable about global politics and economics - also more likely than the less-educated to give to international charities that support development? Generally, do education and religiosity shape the values and perceptions that compel individuals to support one cause over another?

### **The Determinants of International Giving: What is Known**

There is an extensive literature on the determinants of charitable giving, in the United States especially. Research has tested the effect of numerous variables on the likelihood that people give. A common theme is that "social identity is an important determinant of philanthropy" (Berger 2006: 131). Social participation is commonly found to influence charitable behavior (Havens and Schervish 1997; Putnam 2000; Brown 2001). Yet while there has been considerable research on the determinants of charitable giving to all causes taken together, and although data are kept on the incidence and size of donations to different causes, there has been little inquiry into who gives to each cause (Atkinson 2007; Micklewright and Schnepf 2007; Okten and Osili 2007). The consequence is a dearth of knowledge about American donor bases for particular causes, including international charity.

The topic has recently garnered more attention in the United Kingdom. In conjunction with the Economic and Social Research Council, researchers at the Southampton Statistical Sciences Research Institute (S3RI) and Oxford University are currently performing descriptive and econometric analysis on 'Giving to Overseas Causes' in the UK (see Micklewright and Wright 2005; Atkinson 2007; Atkinson and Eastwood 2007; Piper and Schnepf 2007). Micklewright and Schnepf (2007) report, for instance, that increases in income lead to statistically similar increases in donations to domestic and international causes, but that education has a larger effect on international, rather than domestic, giving.

Such findings are not necessarily true of international charity in the US: Micklewright and Wright (2005) contend that the determinants of giving are likely to vary by nation. Just as

there are country-specific determinants for Official Development Assistance (such as geo-political strategic considerations (Alesina and Dollar 2000)), there may be unique determinants for private giving to international charities by individuals in the US. Compared to the British, fewer Americans give a smaller percentage of their charitable budgets to international causes. These uncommon donors may exhibit unique characteristics. In a working paper for the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, Okten and Osili (2007) use econometric analysis to identify the determinants of private support for international aid by US citizens who express their concern by making charitable donations and/or by being in favor of government assistance. They find that income and education are significant predictors of support for international causes. Their study is original in its intent to examine American determinants of international aid. To my knowledge, it remains the only existing econometric analysis on the topic. Although similar in its intent to identify the determinants of international charity, this study utilizes different means to different ends. Essentially, the data set I use uniquely equips me to compare the effect of a wide range of determinants on private giving to international charities versus a number of domestic causes<sup>7</sup>.

### **An Outline of this Study**

The dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter Two, I review both the theoretical and empirical literature which ask “why do people give to charity” and “who gives to charity.” Chapter Three presents the methodology - my approach to the research question as it is informed by the literature and the available data, as well as the methods I use in descriptive and econometric analysis. The results of the analysis and a discussion of the findings are provided in Chapter Four. Chapter Five concludes with overall observations and some suggestions for future research.

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<sup>7</sup> More specifically, to compare the determinants of private giving to international versus domestic causes, I choose the Giving and Volunteering data set for its specified inquiry into charitable behavior, for its breadth of related variables and charitable causes. Okten and Osili (2007) analyze the 2001 and 2003 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for its detailed information on wealth and the Generalized Social Survey for its variable on ideological support for government assistance. These data sets are well-tailored to their research purpose, to assess American’s ‘preferences for redistribution’ vis-a-vis private and/or public assistance to developing countries. For my research purposes, the Giving and Volunteering data set provides more suitable distinctions based on the formal charitable sectors to which people give. One important difference between the PSID and Giving and Volunteering data sets is that the PSID classifies donations to help the needy meet their basic needs and to international aid or peace as two separate charitable causes (Wilhelm 2006), a distinction that would confound my analysis of the factors which influence donors to identify with and give to people in need in the developing world, versus other causes. Furthermore, while Okten and Osili make no reference to religion in their written analysis, and apparently include only one dummy variable for “Catholic” in their regression analysis, I build this study on my hypothesis that religion uniquely influences giving to international charities.

## Chapter Two: Literature Review

### 2.1 Introduction

There are many reasons why people help others: to feel good about themselves, achieve social status, obey social norms, reduce the negative consequences to themselves or others' suffering, secure some kind of return, fulfill religious beliefs, work toward secular principles like justice, and increase others' welfare. Intuitively one knows that prosocial behavior - meaning any action commonly considered as favorable, helpful, and encouraging of social cohesion - usually results from a complex interplay of these factors.

Charitable giving is but one type of prosocial behavior, and thus may be motivated by somewhat distinct factors. An individual gives money for a different mix of reasons than those that motivate her to volunteer at a soup kitchen, for instance, or perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on a stranger. Variation exists across individuals as well: some people are more likely to give money to an international non-governmental organization (NGO), others to go on a "mission trip" to a developing country. Bekkers and Wiepking (2007) note an important difference between charitable giving and other kinds of helping behavior: namely, that the beneficiary and benefactor may never meet. Lacking the motivational immediacy of face-to-face interactions, charitable giving is presumably influenced by other factors<sup>8</sup>. Because geographic and cultural distance further separate participants in international exchange, there may be especially distinct factors involved.

This chapter reviews the literature supporting the idea that there are unique determinants for giving, and to international causes in particular. In their literature review on the determinants of charitable giving, Bekkers and Wiepking (2007) make a methodological distinction between two types of research: cross-sectional data reveal "who gives what" and experimental data explore "why people give." Although I focus my secondary analysis on cross-sectional data to ask "who gives to international causes," I review literature asking both questions to build my hypothesis that Americans who give internationally may be uniquely influenced by educational and religious institutions which encourage them to identify with citizens in

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<sup>8</sup> Although another obvious difference is that it may be less physically and emotionally taxing to write a check than to volunteer, there are still a set of factors that distinguish givers from non-givers which are presumably distinct from the factors determining other, more interactive helping behaviors.

developing countries. In the first half of the review, I explore the literature which attempts to answer “why” people give. Because the literature on altruism is extensive, I rely on a few comprehensive reviews, going into more depth where theories have potentially unique explanatory power for giving to international causes. In the second half, I review the empirical literature that explores “who gives.” Here, too, I draw from the broad literature on the determinants of giving to provide particular context for my research on international giving.

## **2.2 Theoretical Literature Review**

### **Egoism and Altruism**

Why would an American give her money to an organization that benefits homeless children in Brazil? Is it because she is a good person who cares selflessly for children, or because she wants to be known among her peers as a world-wise altruist? While the particular mix of factors which produce charitable giving to international programs may differ from those producing other kinds of prosocial behavior, the underlying forces may be similar: people care about others and helping has its own rewards.

The long list of prosocial motivations at the beginning of this chapter has historically been reduced to fit a conceptual frame consisting of two opposing forces, altruism and self-interest. Based on rational choice theory, the model assumes the primacy of an individual’s utility function: people are naturally motivated and equipped to maximize their personal gain (Wang and Graddy 2008). As a result, most prosocial behavior can be ultimately understood as an investment in one’s own interests. However, acts that do not appear self-interested have long perplexed theorists, leading notable economists like Smith, Bentham and Mill to conclude that humans have a dual nature (Monroe 1994)<sup>9</sup>. Occasionally and perhaps inexplicably, people behave altruistically with no apparent personal gain. Definitions vary, but altruistic behavior is always understood as incurring more cost than providing benefit to the helper, and is therefore distinct from self-interest.

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<sup>9</sup> Smith wrote: “how selfish soever man be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it” (from *Theory of Moral Sentiments* in Piliavin and Charng 1990: 27). Today, this apparent behavioral inconsistency is called the “collective good problem” or the “participation paradox” (Wang and Graddy 2008: 25).

## **The Mixed Model**

Although the competing forces model has a certain metaphysical appeal, it does not lend to systematic exploration of prosocial motivations; it is difficult to investigate and predict behavior that swings dramatically back and forth between instinctual self-preservation and transcendental self-sacrifice. Frustrated by the lack of analytical precision, Becker (1976: 817) quipped that in economics, altruism is typically “explained by human nature or an equivalent evasion of the problem.” More recently, the egoism/altruism model has been fitted to a continuum with selfishness and selflessness at the extreme poles, and “impure altruism” in between (Andreoni 1990). The widely accepted idea is that prosocial behavior results from a complex mix of self- and other-oriented motivations (Monroe 1994; Piliavin and Charng 1990). A North American may give money for flu vaccinations in Mexico because he 1) is selflessly concerned for Mexicans’ well-being or 2) selfishly wants to decrease the chance that the flu spreads. The more likely story, however, is that he is motivated by both these factors and others. In other words, he is an impure altruist. Common sense and research confirm that the “mixed model...is consistent with observed patterns of giving” (Andreoni 1990: 465).

Despite the mixed model’s plausibility, some have attempted to completely demythologize altruism by arguing that all behavior is inherently motivated by self-interest. The following sections outline single and mixed-model explanations of prosocial behavior posed by economists, psychologists, and sociobiologists.

## ***Economics***

The potential benefits to one who performs an apparently “selfless” act are numerous. As economists have refined utility function theories, expanded them to include social and psychological factors, and invalidated moralistic connotations, they have recast altruism as a rational modification of self-interest - not an exception to it (Monroe 1994). French politician Alexis de Tocqueville’s famous phrase “self-interest, rightly understood” describes the “enlightened” way in which Americans achieve their ends by forming voluntary associations beneficial to the entire community. In Becker’s words, “altruism pays” (1976: 871). Even if



an act looks altruistic, the rational agent has actually managed to satisfy her own preferences and priorities, which include the pleasure she receives from helping.

Other theoretical approaches to altruism do not deny the possibility that people put others' interests ahead of their own, but simply reject the idea that prosocial behavior can be motivated by selflessness alone. Concerning charitable giving, economists explore the theoretical crowding-out effect of government funding on donations. If, for instance, donors give to international development agencies solely to meet recipients' needs, then for every dollar more that the government gives, informed donors should give a dollar less. As long as the goods are provided, the "pure altruist" does not care who provides them<sup>10</sup>. Research finds, however, that crowding out is far from perfect, and usually rather small (Piliavin and Charng 1990, Rose-Ackerman 1996, Ribar and Wilhelm 2002). Donors are not indifferent to who gives. They get something out of giving, something more than the dispassionate, disinterested knowledge that others' needs are being met.

Provided a choice between giving directly or indirectly through taxes, do Americans prefer to experience the gratification associated with direct giving? To explore this question, Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) analyze panel data from 1986 to 1992 on the relationship between public and private aid for international relief and development. They focus on international aid because the public goods provided by international donations are not available to donors for consumption as are those provided by donations to local causes<sup>11</sup>. Therefore, they are able to isolate material motivations, and to explore the "warm-glow" theory that people give because it makes them feel good. The results show small crowding-out effects, robust to different levels of donor-awareness about government spending, and thus suggest that international donors are indeed impure altruists who enjoy the act of giving. They do not deny the

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<sup>10</sup> It is confusing that the "pure altruist" is also the free rider, that people who experience the so-called "joy-of-giving" are impure altruists (Rose-Ackerman 1996). The contradictory moralistic connotations of these and other concepts confound any in-depth study of altruism. For example, Henkel and Stirrat (1997) argue that when a gift is completely free and disinterested (altruistic) - when it denies reciprocity - it is paternalistic. The gift is considered both pure and immoral because in this society, religion, politics, and the economy are "each ruled by [their] own morality" (Henkel and Stirrat 1997: 71). With self-interest lauded as the appropriate orientation in the economic realm, and self-sacrifice in the religious, it is unsurprising that we speak so unintelligibly about 'the right thing to do.' Nor is it surprising that prosocial motivations are so elusive. Particularly in the US, where Judeo-Christian and capitalist values co-exist in a similarly conflicting relationship, it is difficult to tease out the mechanisms underlying charitable behavior. Research participants may not know or may not give detailed information about why they give.

<sup>11</sup> For instance, a family gives to a local natural history museum and enjoys a new exhibit.

possibility that dispassionate altruism plays a role in giving, but are confident that, due to impure motivations, moderate increases in government assistance will not lead to proportional losses in private donations.

### ***Psychology***

Psychologists also argue that what appears to be altruistic is actually prompted by self-serving motives. For example, when individuals refuse to participate in activities promoted by peers such as volunteering, they risk ostracism. Hence, such acts are not voluntary (Rapaport 1995). Developmental psychology poses that, as infants, people learn to be happy when others are happy and sad when others are sad because we depend on others for our survival (Marwell 1982 in Piliavin and Charng 1990). In effect, we learn to empathize. We are further compelled to help because people treat us poorly when they are upset, whether or not we are the cause (ibid). Thus, people help to reduce their “aversive arousal” to others’ suffering (Batson and Shaw 1991: 114).

Does the threat of terrorism - a potential negative externality of poverty and inequality - lead Americans to give to international relief and development agencies? Batson and Shaw (1991) argue that the aversive-arousal explanation is less predictive than the empathy-altruism model; unless we are directly exposed to dramatic suffering and its potential consequences, there may not be enough stimulus to compel *reflexive* action. However, because we are socialized to empathically take on others’ perspectives, we are compelled to act by our own reaction. Thus, an American woman may give to an international development agency because she empathizes with the Bolivian mother of a malnourished child.

### ***Sociobiology***

If preconditions for empathy develop in infancy, then it is not a transcendental virtue, but an evolutionary survival strategy. Likewise, altruism may not be a surrender of self-interest, but a biologically competitive application of it (Becker 1976). Sociobiologists explain that while self-interest is an effective orientation between individuals, group-interest is more competitive between groups (Monroe 1994). Essentially, a group has a better chance of reproducing itself if some members sacrifice their own interests to serve the others. Furthermore, within groups,

people who behave ‘altruistically’ may receive social rewards that outweigh the cost of sacrifice.

It is difficult to find an application of sociobiological theories for giving to international development, unless we 1) return to the negative externality explanation that by “fighting global poverty and inequality” with donations, Americans increase their own chances for survival or 2) expand the group size to the total world population, suggesting that donors instinctively perceive a collective battle against poverty and inequality. It seems more likely, however, that altruism *as an innate biological mechanism* (Piliavin and Charng 1990) is expressed in smaller groups where individuals have an almost reflexive response to the needs of people they know.

What, then, constitutes the motivation for international philanthropy, for giving to distant strangers? Undoubtedly, some donors to international causes have either traveled to or were born outside the US. But what about those who, in effect, give to complete strangers? Although making sacrifices within one’s group may be a survival strategy of the fittest, it is unlikely that those who give outside of their group are less intelligent, adaptive, or successful than people who give domestically.

### **Paradigm Shift: Identification Theory**

Despite the sophisticated development of the altruism/egoism model over time, theories based on the “primacy of self-interest” - even as it operates in a group - do not fully explain all kinds of helping behavior (Monroe 1994; Rose-Ackerman 1996). Havens and Schervish (1997) suggest an alternate approach: research should explore the extent to which people identify their interests as *indistinct* from others’ interests. The conceptual shift is subtle but significant: if people who exhibit prosocial behavior do not perceive a clear separation between their own and others’ interests, then the model which explains their motivation should not assume entirely separate utility functions<sup>12</sup>. Becker (1976) paves the way for identification theory with his “rotten kid theorem” that individuals in a family (in any relationship of exchange) behave benevolently towards other family members because their

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<sup>12</sup> Of course, this way of thinking is not new: Edgeworth wrote in 1881 that “between the frozen pole of egoism and the tropical expanse of utilitarianism [there is] the position of one for whom in a calm moment his neighbour’s utility compared with his own neither counts for nothing, nor ‘counts for one’, but counts for a fraction” (in Atkinson 2007: 3).

utility is ultimately *co-determined*. Behavior that gives the impression of individual self-interest or sacrifice is actually motivated by “mutual self interest” or “multi-person altruism” (Havens and Schervish 1997: 237).

Batson and Shaw (1991) emphasize that the conceptualization of mutual self-interest has occurred alongside developments in the broader scientific community that people are social beings. Empirical research in the US accordingly indicates that social capital is an important predictor of charitable giving (Piliavin and Charng 1990; Havens and Schervish 1997; Putnam 2000; Brown 2001; Berger 2006). In particular, the voluntary associations and religious communities in which people participate influence how they spend their money (Rose-Ackerman 1996)<sup>13</sup>. By actively participating in the lives of others, people are more likely to perceive their interests as interdependent. Havens and Schervish (1997: 240) describe “communities of participation” as “necessary engagement points for altruism” and Batson and Shaw (1991) use the language of “attachment” to describe the identification which occurs in these settings.

The concept of identification is an especially useful tool to explore the determinants of giving to different charitable causes. While all givers may be motivated by a mixture of self- and other-serving reasons, they give to different causes because they identify with them in largely distinct ways: a cancer survivor gives to a health-related organization, an avid hiker to the environment, and a former Peace Corps volunteer to international development. Naturally, people are more likely to identify with the individuals, groups and causes with which they come into contact. Therefore it is unsurprising that international causes receive a considerably smaller portion of private donations than domestic causes<sup>14</sup>.

For the relative minority of donors who *do give* internationally, what leads them to identify? Monroe (1994) proposes that cognitive factors such as identity, self-perception, world view, and empathy can lead to identification. In a globalizing world where images of and

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<sup>13</sup> Sudgen explains that, within participatory groups, people are compelled to give by their sense that free-riding is immoral. However, they do not calculate the amount based on “an absolute moral imperative” but with respect to what others give (in Rose-Ackerman 1996: 713).

<sup>14</sup> I refer specifically to giving by Americans, for whom communities of participation may be especially significant predictors of charitable behavior. The determinants of giving vary from one culture to the next (Micklewright and Wright 2005).

information about developing countries are increasingly accessible through the media and internet, exposure may lead to identification. News about the global consequences of poverty and inequality may also encourage individuals in the US to perceive their interests as tied to their international neighbors' interests. As noted in Chapter One, a focal point of my research is to explore the possibility that educational and religious institutions encourage people to identify with and give to people living in the developing world. However, Batson and Shaw (1991) argue that attachments resulting from personal interaction are stronger than cognitively formed bonds. According to this argument, international travel and being born outside the US are likely to have a stronger effect on giving to international causes than purely perceptual associations.

To explain giving to international causes by citizens in the United Kingdom, Atkinson (2007) builds a mixed model that combines "impure altruism" with a specific "identification approach." The model is based on the assumptions that international donors 1) care about the well-being of recipients and 2) are moved by the feelings that arise when they "visualize" recipients<sup>15</sup>. Atkinson emphasizes the necessary inclusion of both factors; donors cannot be motivated purely by their desire to help 'the poor' because the immense number of potential recipients, the depth of need, and the relatively small size of the donor pool limit their capacity to help. Conversely, behavior cannot be purely motivated by 'warm-glow' feelings, since distressing feelings like worry over the effectiveness of aid do not preclude giving.

## **2.3 Empirical Literature Review**

### **Introduction**

The theoretical debate attests that charitable giving is motivated by a complex mix of factors that are hard to pinpoint. Critical realist Roy Bhaskar explains the empirical dilemma: while real mechanisms generate actual phenomena, those mechanisms do not generate uniform events, and thus the 'real' may or may not be empirically observable (Irwin 1997). However,

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<sup>15</sup> Atkinson notes that visualization is encouraged by development NGOs and is even "made concrete in programmes where donors 'adopt' families" (2007: 7). The idea that people actually live on less than \$1 a day elicits not only aversive emotions, but the sense that relatively small donations can have a powerful impact (ibid). Atkinson's model fits with literature suggesting that donors consider recipient identity - their level of need and 'deservingness' - when deciding how to allocate donations (Bekkers and Wiepking 2007; Batson and Shaw 1991).

Bhaskar holds that insofar as mechanisms do generate observable, regular phenomena, social scientists can use what they learn for social good. Research on philanthropy has shown observable, regular, and statistically significant relationships between variables such as education, gender, income, religion and charitable giving (see Bekkers and Wiepking 2007). While the ‘real’ mechanisms which lead to charitable giving may not be directly measurable, quantitative research can describe observable phenomena.

Due to the complex interplay of motivating factors, altruism is hard to qualify, much less to quantify. As a result, empirical research about giving usually asks “who gives” and “how much” rather than “why do people give.” By asking “who gives” - or, in more particular terms, “who gives to which causes” - we may learn about the economic, political, social, psychological, and even biological forces that motivate international giving.

### **The Determinants of Giving**

The literature is largely silent on “who gives to international causes,” (Atkinson 2007; Micklewright and Schnepf 2007; Okten and Osili 2007). However, there is more than enough evidence that: 1) giving more generally is influenced by a number of demographic, attitudinal, and behavioral variables and 2) these variables shape identification with different causes in different ways. In this section, I review the empirical literature, focusing on commonly studied determinants such as income, education, religion, and gender<sup>16</sup>. Where it is available, I review work that disaggregates causes. Yoshioko (2008) descriptively explores the charitable preferences of million-dollar donors. Others utilize econometric analysis: Marx (2000) looks at the gendered determinants of giving to human services and Steinberg and Wilhelm (2005) find a significant effect of race on giving to the homeless. As noted in Chapter One, the Southampton Statistical Sciences Research Institute (S3RI) at Oxford University is currently exploring the determinants of international charity by citizens of the UK, and Okten and Osili (2007) provide the only available econometric analysis of the determinants of giving to “international aid and peace” by individuals in the US. Findings from these studies are incorporated into the literature review.

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<sup>16</sup> As in the theoretical review, I use existing reviews of the literature as well as individual studies. Bekkers and Wiepking (2007) give a comprehensive review, to which I frequently refer. Unless otherwise specified, all studies were performed in the USA. Bekkers and Wiepking (2007) review the international literature, so citations refer to findings that are typical across countries.

### ***Financial Capital***

Income is a fundamental component of any study on philanthropy. Research consistently shows that as income increases, so does the probability that a household gives to charity (Regnerus, Smith, and Sikkink 1998; Brown and Rooney 2005; Bekkers and Wiepking 2007). Income is also significantly and positively related to the amount given (Regnerus, Smith, and Sikkink, 1998; Bekkers and Wiepking 2007). Income has little effect, however, on the percent of income donated (Steinberg and Wilhelm 2003; Havens and Schervish 1995).

The effect of income on donations may vary across causes. Yoshioka (2008) reports his interesting descriptive finding that the causes wealthy Americans support vary by the way in which they made their money: entrepreneurs, scientists, physicians, and inventors are more likely to give to international organizations than investors, professional athletes, heirs, and salary recipients, who are more likely to give to other causes such as religion, education and health. As suggested previously, international philanthropy is stereotypically associated with rich celebrities and million-dollar donations, but research does not indicate a clear relationship between income and giving to international causes. Micklewright and Schnepf (2007) find that in the UK, when other factors are held constant, income does not have a statistically significant effect on giving internationally, but does, for example, on the probability of giving to children's charities and to domestic causes combined. Okten and Osili (2007) find a significant positive relationship in the US between household income and giving to international causes, but that wealthier households are less likely to believe that the government should spend more on international assistance.

### ***Human Capital***

Controlling for income and other correlated factors, education positively affects charitable giving, both in the propensity to give and the amount given (Bekkers and Wiepking 2007; Steinberg and Wilhelm 2003; Havens and Schervish 1997). Bekkers and Wiepking (2007) note that Regnerus, Smith, and Sikkink (1998) do not find a significant relationship between education and giving in the US, but that they only examine giving to 'the poor.' One can therefore deduce that education affects giving to particular causes differently. In the UK, Micklewright and Schnepf (2007) find that giving internationally is uniquely associated with having a higher degree. Okten and Osili (2007) also find a positive association between

educational achievement and support for international organizations in the US: households with advanced degrees are the most likely to give, and those headed by people with at least a college degree are the least likely to think the government is spending too much on international development assistance.

### ***Social Capital***

Brown (2001) argues that some of the effect of education is better explained by social capital variables which are often left out of the giving equation. In other words, it is not the fact that someone has an education, but how education embeds him in a community that leads to charitable giving. Brown (2001: 15) finds that when income and “the richness of the respondent’s networks of social capital” are controlled for, education still predicts giving, but to a lesser extent. Many studies similarly explore the effect of social capital on giving. Wang and Graddy (2008) find that “civic engagement” is significantly associated with an increased probability of giving. Havens and Schervish (1997: 256) find that variables pertaining to “communities of participation” are the most predictive of the percentage of income given, explaining that “the identification process is amalgamated with and or triggered by active involvement and participation”<sup>17</sup>. They conclude that it is not personal generosity, but associational “opportunities and obligations” which shape giving (ibid).

One of the most commonly studied sources of social capital and determinants of giving in the US is religion. When all causes are taken together, religious Americans are not only more likely to give, but they give more in total, give a greater percentage of their income, and are more likely to give to secular causes (Rose-Ackerman 1996; Regnerus, Smith, and Sikkink 1998; Berger 2006; Bekkers and Wiepking 2007). Clearly, the values and behaviors institutionalized by religious organizations affect the way American religious practitioners steward their resources.

Wang and Graddy (2008) note that active community involvement is what separates givers from non-givers, not the domain in which individuals are involved. Non-religious group

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<sup>17</sup> Havens and Schervish (1997) test the effect of five main sets of variables on the percent of income given: communities of participation, frameworks of consciousness, direct requests for charity, experiences from youth, and the existence of discretionary resources. They find that three of the five most significant predictors are in the “communities of participation” category. They are careful to explain that while the other factors do not show significant effects, they can “affect [community] participation which, in turn, affects giving” (ibid: 256).



membership may be as predictive of giving as religious membership. Still, different types of social networks may influence donors to support different causes. Whaites (1999) notes, for instance, that compared to other charitable causes, a large portion of northern international development organizations are religiously based. Perhaps this is because many religious texts, traditions and mores command believers to serve those in need and to transform the institutions which perpetuate need (Ferris 2005). Another explanation is that religious institutions may encourage believers to engage financial resources in their attempt to convert non-believers.

Distinguishing between religious and non-religious membership may explain some of the variance in causes that people support. Likewise, distinctions between faiths, denominations and sects may be fruitful (Berger 2006). All causes taken together, Bekkers and Wiepking (2007) and Regnerus, Smith, and Sikkink (1998) find denominational variation in the amount donated, where Steinberg and Wilhelm (2003) do not. This effect may also vary across countries. For instance, church attendance does not predict the propensity to give in Germany, but it does in the US (Bekkers and Wiepking 2007).

### ***Demographic Factors***

Financial, human, and social capital influence giving. The quantity and quality of capital to which people have access is influenced by demographic factors such as age, gender, race, and geographic region. Therefore, it is necessary to control for the effect of these variables on giving. To do so also illustrates the significant effect that social identity has on giving (Berger 2006). For instance, because experience and resources accumulate and values change over time, age affects giving, and may be particularly associated with giving to certain causes. Age is typically found to be positively associated with the propensity to give and the amount given (Regnerus, Smith, and Sikkink, 1998; Bekkers and Wiepking 2007), but at a diminishing rate (Brooks 2007).

Philanthropic literature has extensively explored the relationship between gender and charitable giving. While findings vary by country and study, in most cases, women are found more likely to give, and to give to more causes (Bekkers and Wiepking 2007; Piper and Schnepf 2007). As a result, women are often referred to as the more altruistic sex. However,

as discussed, altruism is a complex concept, and it may have different applications for different gender roles. In an experimental study in Scandinavia and North America, Brunel et al (2006) find that male and female test subjects prefer different charity appeals: in more masculine, individualistic societies like the US and Canada, men respond more readily to egoistic requests for charity (e.g. “your help is needed”) while women prefer altruistic solicitations (“someone needs help”). In more feminine Scandinavian societies, women prefer egoistic and men altruistic appeals. Interestingly, all subjects other than American men believed the government has a greater responsibility toward others than they have personally.

If indeed there are differences in the way men and women tend to identify with and help others, then they may give to distinct causes which appeal to their gendered ideals. Therefore, the more interesting results are those that disaggregate causes. Marx (2000) reports that more women than men give to human services in the US, and explains that women are significantly more likely to believe they have the power to improve the welfare of others. Micklewright and Schenpf (2007) find women in the UK to be more likely to give to all causes except sports and the arts. Concerning international development, they find that women are more likely to give, but there is no statistically significant difference in the amount given.

When there are differences in the amount given, controlling for income can reveal the cause of the disparity: income inequality. This applies also to race. Studies show that once education and income are controlled for, differences in both the propensity to give and the amount given disappear (Musick, Wilson and Bynum 2000; Steinberg and Wilhelm 2005). However, even when controlling for the effect of said factors, research finds variance in the ways different races give and the causes they support. Steinberg and Wilhelm (2005) find that African-Americans at all income levels are more likely than whites to give money and other resources to homeless people. According to the idea that people give to those with whom they identify, their finding makes sense, since African-Americans are disproportionately represented in the US homeless population. Musick, Wilson, and Bynum (2000) find that African-Americans have less human capital on average than whites, but social capital makes up some of the difference; church attendance has a greater effect on black than white volunteering, for instance.

Cultural differences are not limited to race and ethnicity. Divergent political, economic, and social climates in the four major US regions - Northeast, Midwest, South, and West - may affect people's giving patterns and preferences. Bielefeld, Rooney, and Steinberg (2005) find that the state-level poverty rate, income gap, public expenditures and political culture - what they call "macro-level" variables - influence giving, even when holding other factors such as income and education constant. Regional differences may also influence support for international causes. Supporting the idea that people who give internationally identify with the foreign recipients, Okten and Osili (2007) find that non-immigrant households in communities with sizable immigrant populations are significantly more likely to give. Kerlin and Reid (2006) note that the majority of international aid organizations are situated on the east and west coast and in Texas and Florida. Awareness about international issues is likely to be greater in the places where there are large immigrant populations.

### ***"Macro-level" Determinants***

Other macro-level factors that may influence charitable giving include natural, economic, and geo-political shocks. Crises like the 2001 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City, the devastating 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia and recently high unemployment rates in the US bring about great need, but do they also elicit a strong charitable response by individuals? To the extent that the consequences of crises can be disaggregated, Brown and Rooney (2005) use data from Giving USA and the Internal Revenue Service to explore whether high giving periods from 1939-1999 are statistically more associated with crises or with favorable economic conditions. They find that economic factors are much more predictive of giving to all causes taken together than crises. While they are encouraged that crises do not lead to dramatic fluctuations in philanthropy, they are discouraged that neither do crises seem to stimulate magnanimity<sup>18</sup>.

Giving to all causes combined may be primarily subject to economic conditions, but different types of crises may evoke different philanthropic responses. For instance, while less than two percent of US households typically give internationally, 26 percent gave to the 2004 tsunami relief efforts (COPPS 2005). These donations may have replaced others, perhaps even those

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<sup>18</sup> Brown and Rooney (2005) stipulate that some of their results suggest a larger association between philanthropic giving and crises, and that further research is needed to clarify. They specifically note the value of disaggregating causes in future research.

that would have gone to more long-term international development. The point remains that shocks may shift donations from one cause to another.

## **Methodology**

### **3.1 Introduction**

If different people give to different causes for different reasons, then research can identify divergent determinants using data which survey a sufficiently large and representative sample of charitable donors, which include a variety of demographic and behavioral variables, and which distinguish between the causes supported. Briefly, my approach to the research problem is to analyze such a data source - “Giving and Volunteering 2001” - with a series of logistic regressions where the dichotomous dependent variables indicate whether the respondent gave to particular causes, and the independent variables are a fixed set associated with charitable giving. By comparing the regression results, I am able to confirm that the determinants of giving vary by cause. My focus is on the unique determinants of giving to international programs. In this chapter, I describe the data set, discuss how it shaped my methodological approach to the research question, and explain the statistical methods used.

### **3.2 The Data Set**

Between March and June, 2001, the Independent Sector (2001) collected data for “Giving and Volunteering in the United States 2001” with the intent purpose of exploring philanthropy among American individuals<sup>19</sup>. The data set, which describes the charitable behavior of 4,216 American households during 2000, contains a wide variety of demographic, attitudinal, and behavioral variables, and differentiates between 14 different causes to which households made contributions. The data were collected by random digit dial telephone interviews. Participants were adults, 21 years of age and older, who answered the phone or were available for interview. For representativeness and analytical purposes, a subsample of males and an over-sample of ethnic minority and high income households were taken and duly weighted. My analysis of the data is also weighted. Of the 4,216 respondent households, 3,874 (92 percent) contributed to at least one cause in 2000, while many gave to more than one of the following causes: Adult Recreation; Arts, Culture, and Humanities; Education; Environment; Health; Human Services; International or Foreign Programs; Non-Family Individuals; Political Organizations, Private and Community Foundations; Public or Societal Benefit;

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<sup>19</sup> The Independent Sector is a private, non-profit coalition of hundreds of charitable organizations in the US, and is a leader in philanthropic research and coordination.

Relatives; Religion; and Youth Development. The 14 corresponding survey questions ask respondents if their household gave to each individual cause in 2000 and include a short list of examples for each cause that were read to the respondent (see Appendix 1 which includes the survey questions for all causes).

The question pertaining to international giving was:

In 2000, did you and members of your household contribute money or property to or for international or foreign programs, either in the US or abroad? Examples include relief abroad and student or cultural exchange programs.

Only 264 households indicated that they gave specifically to international causes - about six percent of giving households, compared to about 63 percent of households that gave to religion, for instance (see Table 1 below). Okten and Osili (2007) find similarly small support for international aid organizations based on data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 2001 and 2003 - just four percent of households gave to international causes, constituting only one percent of total charitable donations for those years. The relatively small proportion of households contributing to international programs is in itself an interesting finding, but it also indicates that households which prioritize international giving may have unique characteristics.

**Table 3.1 Proportion of total donor population that gave to each cause**

Cause	Proportion	Cause	Proportion
International	0.06 (0.004)	Human Services	0.36 (0.007)
Adult Recreation	0.06 (0.004)	(Non-Family) Individuals	0.26 (0.007)
the Arts	0.17 (0.006)	Political	0.14 (0.005)
Education	0.31 (0.007)	Public/Societal Benefit	0.11 (0.005)
the Environment	0.19 (0.006)	Relatives	0.41 (0.008)
Foundations	0.07 (0.004)	Religion	0.62 (0.008)
Health	0.38 (0.008)	Youth Development	0.35 (0.007)
Total observations	4178		

*Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses*

*Source: Own Calculations from Giving and Volunteering USA 2001*

## Data Limitations

While the data set provides the necessary components to explore my research question, there are some limitations. Perhaps the most significant limitation is that within the survey questionnaire, delineations between charitable organizations are not ideal. The category “international or foreign programs” includes donations made to international organizations which do not necessarily benefit development causes per se, such as “student or cultural exchange programs”<sup>20</sup>. Despite the inclusion of these donations in the international category, as noted in Chapter One, Kerlin and Reid (2006) find that the majority of donations to international causes are specifically for the developing world; almost three quarters of international NGOs and 90 percent of the donations they receive are designated for “development and assistance.” The remaining organizations and donations belong to the two categories, international understanding (which includes exchange programs) and international affairs.

An associated concern is that donations to other causes like “private and community foundations” and “public and societal benefit” may actually go to international programs: Ford, Rockefeller, Rotary, and Lyon’s all have local and international branches. Likewise, donations to youth development and health may be designated for programs in developing countries. In their annual “Global Philanthropy Index,” the Hudson Institute (2007) reports that \$15.9 billion of donations to religion, education, and other private voluntary organizations in 2006 were designated for international purposes. Unclear delineations between causes are not unique to the Giving and Volunteering data set<sup>21</sup>. The philanthropic sector lacks a collective approach to classifying international donations (Kerlin and Reid 2006; Hudson Institute 2007, 2008).

While overlapping charitable categories limit my research - which is to discern and describe the private donor base for international development - I am confident that the donor’s

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<sup>20</sup> One advantage of the Giving and Volunteering system of classification is that it distinguishes formal donations to international organizations from informal donations to relatives in foreign countries (remittances). There are obviously different determinants for these. My research interest is on the determinants of giving to formal international aid organizations.

<sup>21</sup> Okten and Osili (2007) use the 2001 and 2003 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics which ask if respondents gave to international aid, but only after asking if they made donations to supply the poor with basic needs. Because these are presented as two mutually exclusive categories, with donations to the poor preceding international donations, the survey may have prompted respondents to attribute their donations to developing countries to the former.

intention ultimately comes through. To begin with, since health and education precede international causes in the sequence of survey questions, and since the specific examples given for health and education - such as hospitals, clinics, libraries and primary schools (see Table A.1 in the Appendix) - conceivably primed respondents to think locally rather than globally, they may have attributed donations to international health and educational programs to the international category. Another favorable possibility is that, because questions about giving to education and youth development precede international programs, respondents may have attributed donations which benefit American student exchange programs to these domestic categories. Essentially, I rely on my assumption that donors who give deliberately to international development indicate their priorities appropriately. The category of “international or foreign programs” captures those who give to international development, and more fundamentally, those who look outside the US when designating their donations. Whether they give to a student exchange program or to a capacity-building development project, people who give internationally are likely to care about the welfare of global citizens, to value cultural interaction and exchange, and to identify their interests with people outside their immediate geographic frame of reference. These values, and the attitudes and behaviors resulting from them, need to be better understood.

Another limitation of the data set is that it was collected almost a decade ago. Not only is it possible that events like the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York changed the way Americans think about international relations and how they designate their charitable donations, but it is also likely that globalization continues to fundamentally alter the way people identify their interests in relation to people in other countries. Based on the evidence previously cited that giving is strongly influenced by economic conditions and on the likelihood that “giving begins at home,” international donations may especially suffer during recessions such as the US is currently experiencing<sup>22</sup>. Notwithstanding the effect of economic and other shocks on international giving over the past decade, I assume that there are independent factors

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<sup>22</sup> From the Independent Sector’s official report on “Giving and Volunteering 2001” (2002a: 25): “Since the data for this survey were collected in 2001, the economy has taken a decidedly downward turn. The stock market has declined, unemployment has increased, confidence in major corporations has suffered, and the US has gone to war...while not all signs are negative, with new home sales reaching all time highs and mortgage interest rates remaining low, there is concern in the sector that individual giving has already begun to decline. This study clearly shows that people who are worried about their personal financial condition give less than those who are not worried, so non-profit organizations need to plan.”

*Note: This quotation was written before the US housing bubble burst.*



associated with giving to international causes, and that understanding these factors enables a contextual application.

My analysis is also restricted to some degree by the way in which the survey questions were posed and the data on giving was collected. Specifically, respondents were asked a variety of questions about their individual demographic, attitudinal and behavioral characteristics, but these characteristics were not captured for other household members. Conversely, respondents were asked about charitable donations and income at the household, but not at the individual level. The data thus provide the respondents' personal education level, race, frequency of attendance at religious services, beliefs and attitudes, etc., but only whether *any household member* gave to each type of cause. Rather than convolute my analysis with incompatible individual and household-level variables, I limit my analysis to a subsample of respondents who were also the charity selectors in their households. The questionnaire asks specifically:

Even though members of a household give as a unit, individual members may select certain charities or nonprofit organizations to support. Who in your household is considered most involved in deciding which organizations you give to? Would you say yourself, your spouse or partner, both, yourself and your spouse or partner, or another household member?

By limiting my analysis to respondents who answered that they, themselves decided which organizations to support, I ensure that the determinants of giving to each cause correspond to the appropriate donor characteristics. To be certain that there were no systematic differences between the complete household sample of givers and the charity selector sub-sample in terms of the causes supported, I compared the percentage of givers to each cause in each sample. There were no significant differences (see Tables 1 and 2).

When only counting charity selectors, the sample size of donors who gave internationally drops from 264 to 136 individuals<sup>23</sup>. Even though there are relatively few households that gave internationally, these cases provide sufficient data for analysis. To ensure statistical power in regression analysis, I followed the general rule that for every independent variable in the model, there need to be at least ten test cases corresponding to the dependent variable

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<sup>23</sup> An alternative to decreasing the sample size was to run regressions at the household level. However, the dearth of household level information would have limited my analysis substantially. Key covariates of giving such as education, and key components of my hypothesis such as religious behavior, are only relevant at the individual level.

(Field 2005). Therefore, I have enough degrees of freedom to test my 11 variables of interest, which I describe in the next section at length.

**Table 3.2 Proportion of charity selectors who donated to each cause**

<b>Cause</b>	<b>Proportion</b>	<b>Cause</b>	<b>Proportion</b>
<b>International</b>	<b>0.06</b> <b>(0.005)</b>	Human Services	0.38 (0.010)
Adult Recreation	0.06 (0.005)	(Non-Family) Individuals	0.30 (0.010)
<b>The Arts</b>	<b>0.18</b> <b>(0.008)</b>	Political Organizations	0.14 (0.007)
<b>Education</b>	<b>0.31</b> <b>(0.010)</b>	Public/Societal Benefit	0.12 (0.007)
<b>The Environment</b>	<b>0.21</b> <b>(0.009)</b>	<b>Relatives</b>	<b>0.45</b> <b>(0.011)</b>
Foundations	0.08 (0.006)	<b>Religion</b>	<b>0.64</b> <b>(0.010)</b>
<b>Health</b>	<b>0.42</b> <b>(0.001)</b>	Youth Development	0.36 (0.010)
Total observations	2183		

*Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.*

*Source: Own Calculations from Giving and Volunteering USA 2001*

*In the following analysis, I focus on the seven highlighted causes.*

Establishing that list of independent variables was somewhat challenging, because a notable advantage of the Giving and Volunteering data set is its wide range of interesting variables. In addition to standard demographics like age, gender, race, education, income, and geographic region, the data set includes attitudes and behaviors such as the respondent's sense of moral responsibility to those in need, confidence in public and private organizations including charities, non-religious group membership, religious activity, volunteering, youth experience, and internet use. But to maintain theoretical relevance and to keep the regression model parsimonious, I include only those independent variables most consistent with the literature on giving and with my hypotheses.

Despite its richness, the Giving and Volunteering data set does not include enough information to explain all the variance in giving behavior. For example, one conspicuous gap is a variable pertaining to travel - going abroad may have a greater effect on the likelihood of giving to international programs than religiosity has. In their qualitative research in the UK, Atkinson and Eastwood (2007) find that travel abroad strongly influences the decision to give to international development. Without more detailed information on such factors, analysis is

limited<sup>24</sup>. In my regression results, the effect of missing factors is captured in the ‘noise’ that is not explained by the relationships between the dependent and independent variables. In the following section, however, I explain why the absence of certain factors is mostly immaterial to my research.

### **3.3 Methods**

The literature on giving, my hypotheses, and the characteristics of the data inform my methodological approach to the research question. In this section, I describe the set of logistic regressions I use to ask, “who gives to international causes?”

#### **Comparative Regression Analysis**

My econometric analysis consists of a set of logistic regressions which test the effect of 11 independent variables on the likelihood of giving to each different cause<sup>25</sup>. Although I include tables in the Appendix (A.3-A.16) with regression results for all 14 causes, in my written analysis I focus on six causes: arts, culture and humanities (hereafter referred to as “the arts”); education; the environment; health; relatives; and religion (see the highlighted causes in Table 3.2). For practical purposes, I limit my analysis to this more manageable size.

I choose this particular set of causes because they represent a wide variety of charitable interests with distinct mechanisms for identification. People support artistic and cultural endeavors, the natural world, academic institutions, the sick, people in other countries, family members, and religious congregations as a result of experiences and preferences that may be easier for the researcher to understand or make assumptions about. This means I can make more informed predictions about the divergent determinants of giving. For instance, alumni of graduate institutions and religious congregants presumably support the organizations they identify as the source of important world-views and social networks. People give to family members because they intimately know and love them, and also because they feel obligated. People who give to special interest/luxury causes such as the arts, the environment and

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<sup>24</sup> As noted, very little research has been done on the determinants of giving to different causes, thus explaining the insufficient data (Atkinson 2007; Micklewright and Schnepf 2007; Okten and Osili 2007). Future research on the determinants of giving to specific causes will need to be tailored to that purpose.

<sup>25</sup> I do not estimate a multinomial logit model in the econometric analysis as the categories of giving are not mutually exclusive and independent; an individual charity selector may have donated to more than one cause.

international programs may share high levels of human, financial and social capital corresponding to determinants such as level of education, income, and non-religions membership. However, their various giving preferences may be the result of different values and world-views corresponding to gender, religiosity, and race. Insofar as these characteristics are captured by variables in the data set, I am able to test them for systematic variance. In addition, it is interesting to compare causes that have a large donor base (religion, relatives, health, and education) to those with a smaller base (the arts, environment, and international causes); people who give to the latter causes may have uncommon characteristics.

Rather than building separate models for each cause, I use a consistent regression model across all causes. The most obvious reason is that the data set does not contain sufficient information to build well-tailored models that predict giving to each individual cause. The fundamental reason, however, is methodological: the extensive literature on the determinants of charitable giving identifies several significant predictors including income, education, and religion. Furthermore race, gender, and other demographics have a bearing on whether or not people give. To begin exploring the determinants of giving to disaggregated causes, it makes the most sense to compare the effect of these variables on each cause. For instance, one's level of education may have a larger effect on giving to the arts than to relatives. By regressing a consistent model across the causes - where all the same variables are controlled for - I am able to compare these effects and thus to identify differences in the determinants of giving. To explore my prediction that religiosity and education affect international giving to a greater degree than domestic giving, it is especially effective to have comparable results.

### **Logistic Regression**

As this study explores the relationships between binary categorical dependent variables and a set of categorical or continuous predictor variables, I use logistic regression analysis. Logistic regression predicts the log odds of the dependent variable  $Y$ , where  $\beta_0$  is the constant, and where there are  $z$  independent variables  $X$  (Field 2005):

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{1i} + \beta_2 X_{2i} + \dots + \beta_z X_{zi}$$

In each regression,  $Y$  is a dichotomous variable representing whether or not the respondent  $i$  gave to the cause in question, where  $Y=0$  if the respondent did not give, and when  $Y=1$  if

he/she did give. The independent variables X are those I chose based on the literature and my hypotheses.

Because I am more interested in the relative effect of the predictors on giving to different causes, I base my interpretation not on the overall fit of the regression model and corresponding statistics, but on the relationships between each dependent and independent variable and their significance. The odds ratio is well-suited to this purpose because it captures the change in the odds that an event occurs for every unit change in the independent variable, all other factors held constant (where the probability that one gives ( $Y=1$ ) is divided by the probability that one does not give ( $Y=0$ )) (Field 2005). For instance, imagine that the odds ratio for the effect of foreign travel on giving to international causes is 2.80. Therefore, compared to a respondent who has never been outside the US, a world traveler is 280 percent or 2.8 times more likely to give to international causes. By basing my analysis on the odds ratio, I am able to compare the effect of different factors on giving to different causes and, consequently, to identify divergent determinants.

### **Independent Variables**

In this section, I describe the independent variables I include in the logistic regression model and explain the empirical and theoretical grounds for their inclusion<sup>26</sup>. Each commentary corresponds to material covered in the literature review and is supplemented with findings from the Independent Sector's (IS) analysis of the Giving and Volunteering data. Although their econometric analysis is limited to the determinants of giving to all causes taken together, they disaggregate causes in descriptive analysis to show, for instance, that different causes receive different levels of support. They submit that "giving and volunteering vary by type of organization, and there are differences in the types of organizations, and there are differences in the types of people that support different organizations" (2002a: 18).

### ***Per capita household income***

Income is consistently identified as one of the most important predictors of charitable behavior. For the Giving and Volunteering data set, the IS (2002a: 18) finds that "household

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<sup>26</sup> Table A.2 in the Appendix includes the mean characteristics and standard errors of the 11 explanatory variables.

income is the single major predictor of household giving;" as income increases, so does the propensity to give.

There is likely to be a positive and significant relationship between income and giving to international causes, not only because people with higher incomes are more able to afford giving at home *and* abroad, but because they are also more financially able to travel abroad (holding education and other factors constant). As the effect of income on giving may not be consistent across causes, I predict that income will be more significant for giving to the arts (which could be considered a luxury good) and less significant for giving to religion, than it is for international causes.

The Giving and Volunteering survey question for income was:

To get a picture of people's financial situation we need to know the general range of income of all people we interview. What was the total annual income before taxes, of all members of your household in 2000? Please include wages, salaries, interest, dividends, social security, and other forms of income.

Non-respondents were asked for the same information at \$10,000 increments. To test if financial resources available to the individual have a greater effect on giving to some causes versus others, I use per capita income (household income divided by household size)<sup>27</sup>.

### ***Education***

The IS (2002a) also finds that the propensity to give increases with the respondent's level of education. As education informs one's employment, interests, hobbies, and values, it may have an even stronger bearing on the type of organization one supports. According to my hypothesis that education expands the realm of identifications people make, I predict that international giving significantly increases with the level of education. The more educated a person is, the more he or she may be aware of, concerned about, and committed to the plight of people in developing countries. Conversely, I do not expect to find a strong relationship between education and religious giving, for instance. It is important to point out that the probable collinearity between education and household income make it difficult to determine

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<sup>27</sup> Before dividing by household size, I rescaled income to make the regression results more tractable: because a \$1 increase in income is not associated with a large enough increase in the likelihood of giving, I divided income by 20,000 so that for every one unit increase in income (where \$20,000 is one unit), respondents are X percent more likely to give.

the exact nature of the relationship, as well-educated, globally-aware individuals are likely also to have a high income. I will comment on this further in the presentation of the results in the following chapter.

The data set captures the following five levels of education: 1) less than high school graduate, 2) high school graduate, 3) some technical, trade, or business school/college, 4) four year college/university degree (BA, BS), or 5) some graduate or professional school (MA, MS, Ph.D.). Education is entered as one index variable to preserve degrees of freedom; however I test the sensitivity of my results to the inclusion of education as a set of dummy variables.

### ***Religion***

The effect of religion is a common theme in literature on philanthropy in the US. According to the IS (2002b: 8), affiliation with a church, mosque, synagogue, temple or other religious institution is one of the most powerful predictors of giving: “the beliefs, values, attitudes, and commitments of those who contribute to religion translate into high levels of generosity to other causes as well.”

A central tenet of my hypothesis is that religious institutions encourage people to identify with and give donations to people/organizations in the developing world. Therefore I predict that religiosity is significantly and positively associated with international giving, to a greater degree than with domestic giving<sup>28</sup>. To test the effect of religion on the likelihood of giving to different causes, my regression model includes a variable representing religiosity. Because religious membership may not be a good indicator of one’s actual involvement in a religious community or one’s commitment to religious values, I have chosen instead to use the frequency of attendance at religious services as a measure of religiosity. Personal attendance is captured at four levels: 1) not at all, 2) only a few times a year, 3) once or twice a month, or 4) nearly every week or every week. As with education, these values are represented by an index rather than separate dummy variables, but are tested in the sensitivity analysis as such.

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<sup>28</sup> The Independent Sector’s (2002b) descriptive analysis of the data for relationships between religion, charity, and volunteering suggests the kind of econometric analysis my research entails: households which give internationally give more to religion, on average, than households that give to any other secular cause. In 2001, international donors gave an average of \$2148 to religion. Households which supported foundations gave the second highest average (\$1786) and households that gave to the environment gave the least (\$1403).

### ***Non-Religious Membership***

Many studies find an effect of social or associational capital on prosocial behavior. Not only do financial and human capital increase the likelihood that someone “gives back” to his or her community, but so does active involvement in one’s community. In the US, religion is perhaps the most widely discussed source of social capital leading to prosocial behavior, but non-religious group membership is another aspect of community involvement, with decidedly different characteristics. People who belong to either a religious or non-religious organization, to both, or to neither will have different ideas about how to best benefit their local, national, and global communities. I predict that non-religious membership will have a smaller effect on international giving than religiosity, as certain religious values may more readily motivate members to spread their values abroad. Furthermore, while religiosity may have a more consistent effect on a giver’s attitude toward and perceptions about developing countries, non-religious membership may have a wider range of implications.

The variable I include in the regression for non-religious membership is dichotomous - whether or not the respondent belongs to a non-religious group. Examples that were provided to respondents in the survey include service clubs like Kiwanis and Rotary, alumni and neighborhood organizations, professional societies, labor unions, and sports or hobby groups. It seems logical to speculate that non-religious membership will be associated with giving to causes with membership opportunities such as political parties, the arts, recreation, and public and societal benefit. Unlike religiosity, I do not apply my assumption that non-religious membership is a poor indicator of involvement; for obvious reasons, it is less likely that a person belongs to (or reports belonging to) but does not participate in a non-religious organization.

### ***Youth Volunteering***

The IS (2002a) finds that volunteer experience in a respondent’s youth significantly increases the likelihood that she gives charitably as an adult. Bekkers and Wiepking (2007: 9) suggest the nature of the relationship: giving and volunteering are “complementary forms of prosocial behavior [that] arise from roughly the same set of social factors.” Volunteer experience in one’s youth may play a role in the cultivation of these social factors, in the development of an



altruistic personality/orientation or, at least, in the adoption of altruistic values (Havens and Schervish 1997). Therefore, while religious and non-religious variables represent current sources of social capital, youth volunteering may indicate the formation of prosocial inclinations.

According to my hypothesis that people who give internationally must overcome physical, geographical barriers to identification, youth volunteering may not be as significantly and positively associated with giving to international causes as with other humanitarian causes. Although it may increase the likelihood that one identifies with other people, it does not necessarily increase the likelihood those people will be outside one's local community. On the other hand, it may be possible that youth volunteering exposes people to international causes. The survey question, "when you were young [18 and under] did you do some kind of volunteer work?" does not capture enough detail to establish whether a respondent volunteered for a local or international cause. Given the popularity of youth mission trips to developing countries (Salmon 2008), there very well may be a positive relationship between youth volunteering and international giving.

### ***Race***

As noted in the literature review, the race effect on charitable giving drops once financial and human resources are controlled for. The IS (2002a) attributes remaining variance to the fact that, in the US, white people are more likely to be asked to donate than African-American and Latino people.

Despite the similar giving rates by race when income, education, and being asked to give are held constant, people from different racial/ethnic backgrounds may support different causes. For instance, given the importance of extended families in Latino and African-American culture, they may be more likely to give to relatives than white Americans. Informal remittances sent abroad by Latino families and donations to local relatives by African-American households may replace formal international donations.

Because I am dealing with a limited population size and, therefore, limited degrees of freedom in my regression model, I include only three race dummy variables: white, Latino and African-American, with white as the reference category. There are so few respondents in the other race categories, that the results are not significantly altered by their exclusion.

### ***Age***

The IS (2002a) finds that the propensity to give increases with age, but decreases for people over 65<sup>29</sup>. Due to changing resources, experiences, and values, the causes that people of different ages support may vary. Regardless of the influence of age on giving to particular causes, it is an important variable to include in the regressions to control for the effect on financial and social capital. I do not predict that the likelihood of giving to international programs increases significantly with age, or at least any more so than it does for other causes.

### ***Gender***

In the empirical literature, gender is demonstrated to have a significant effect on the propensity to give and on the type of organization supported. I predict that women are significantly more likely to give to relatives and to causes that explicitly support children such as education and youth development, due to their roles in childbearing, childrearing, and family caretaking. I do not predict significant differences between men and women for international giving. Where traditionally defined altruistic concerns based on gender roles may make women more likely to identify with and give to the poor in developing countries, their inclination to give to the local poor may cancel out the difference.

### ***Children in the Household***

The presence of children in a household undoubtedly affects two key factors associated with giving preferences: resources available for charity and donor values. Because the former is accounted for in the regression by per capita income, the variable is likely to pick up the ideological effect that having children has on giving to different causes. While it is possible

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<sup>29</sup> The documentation does not indicate if employment is held constant.

that households with children are more likely to give to international causes - because parents are concerned with the well-being of children in the developing world and empathize with parents who struggle to feed their families - alternatively, it is possible that giving to domestic causes takes priority. Educational, youth development, and human service programs which benefit local children (with whom donors more readily identify) and which possibly benefit donors' children may receive resources that would otherwise go to international programs.

### ***Region***

Regional differences may affect people's giving behavior. The IS (2002a) finds that church attendance is associated with household giving in the South to a greater degree than in other regions. Regional differences may also affect giving preferences. For instance, people living in the southern "Bible Belt" may be more likely to give to religion regardless of their personal religiosity, and people in the Ivy-Leagued Northeast may be more likely to give to the arts, whether or not they attended prestigious liberal arts universities.

I determined through exploratory analysis that with one exception, the South is the only region significantly associated (positively or negatively) with giving to any particular cause<sup>30</sup>. Because religiosity is controlled for in the model, we can assume there are additional factors in southern culture which lead to certain giving preferences. To conserve degrees of freedom in my regression model, I include "Southern" as the only regional dummy variable. Absorbing the other regions into the dummy variable's reference category does not significantly alter results.

### **Limitations of the Regression Model**

The regression model I describe above will likely fail to account for all the variance between giving groups. No statistical model perfectly explains variance, but in this case, the absence of variables relating specifically to each cause especially restricts explanatory power. In other words, the regression model may have a poor "goodness of fit" for each giving population<sup>31</sup>.

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<sup>30</sup> The exception is that giving to the arts is positively associated with living in the Northeast.

<sup>31</sup> I include Nagelkerke's  $R^2$  in my results tables in the appendix, but emphasize that for regressions with a binary dependent variable, the goodness of fit of the entire model is less pertinent than the size and significance of the effect of each independent variable on the dependent variable (Gujarati 2003; Field 2005). Nagelkerke's

However, because the point of my research is comparative, I am less concerned with overall fit, and more concerned with how the aforementioned factors relatively shape the determinants of giving to different causes. Thus, the presence and absence of explanatory significance are equally interesting. For example, level of education may be strongly associated with giving to international causes but completely unrelated to giving to relatives. I am particularly interested in how the divergent determinants of giving suggest various mechanisms for identification. To continue the previous example, educational institutions may widen students' reference frame and encourage them to identify with international individuals, issues and causes, but may not influence the sense of personal obligation one feels toward family members.

Because this research focuses on giving to international causes, I do explore in sensitivity analysis an additional variable that relates specifically to international giving: whether a respondent was born in the US or another country. Undoubtedly, those born outside the US are more likely to identify with international people and causes. By testing the effect of this dichotomous variable, I attempt to explain a little more of the variance between international and other causes. Furthermore, I emphasize the point that future research should be tailored to explore the unique determinants of giving to particular causes.

There are many other variables of interest in the Giving and Volunteering data set that could be particularly related to giving to international causes. For instance, compared to the average donor, people who give internationally could have a stronger sense of 'noblesse oblige,' the responsibility that some people of privilege feel toward the less socioeconomically privileged. In the Giving and Volunteering survey (2001: 217), respondents were asked if they "feel that those who have more should give to those who have less." International donors may also be more inclined to feel that their donations help them abide by religious teachings to have compassion for and help people whom mainstream America often overlooks. The Giving and Volunteering survey (2001: 216) accordingly asks respondents if they "give to fulfill religious obligations or beliefs."

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$R^2$  is an adaptation of the 'coefficient of determination' for logistic regression, similar to the  $R^2$  in linear regression in that it provides a gauge of the substantive significance of the model (Field 2005).

These and many other interesting possibilities are captured in the data set. However, I do not include them in the regression analyses for two main reasons. The first is that it is difficult to rely on the accuracy of answers to attitudinal questions over the telephone, especially if respondents believe that certain answers will cast them in a more favorable light.

The second reason is more complex: my hypothesis is built on the idea that prosocial behavior is the result of the universal mechanism which underlies (impurely) altruistic behavior: identification. People perceive their interests as indistinct from others' interests and behave in ways that are mutually beneficial. Attitudes and values such as responsibility and compassion indicate that the identification mechanism is at play, but they do not explain where or how it came into play.

In contrast to the attitudinal variables referred to above, demographic and behavioral variables may more readily account for the variance in the causes that people support. For example, being foreign born better explains one's support for international charity than that one feels a sense of responsibility toward others - the latter could be associated with giving to any and all causes. As another example, religious people may be more likely to give to international causes, not because they are innately more universally altruistic, but because they participate in communities which encourage them to identify their interests and concerns in this life and the 'afterlife' with people who presently suffer extreme poverty.

Accordingly, the regression model I build attempts to demonstrate that different kinds of identification occur in religious or non-religious groups, within a particular ethnicity, in educational institutions, and as a result of community involvement in one's youth, etc. Within the data set, being foreign born is the only other variable that potentially indicates the type of experience which might lead people to identify with and give charitably to people who live outside the US. Future research - which has the intent purpose of capturing the determinants of giving to the developing world - should include currently unavailable variables that indicate opportunities for identification like foreign travel, watching or reading the news, and interacting with immigrants from the developing world.

## Findings/Analysis

### 4.1 Introduction

The results of the regression analysis confirm that the determinants of giving vary by cause. Table 4.1 below presents the results from the regressions for international causes, the arts, education, the environment, health, relatives, and religion. The table displays only the odds ratios, standard errors, and level of significance. Because of space constraints, the regression coefficients are displayed in the Appendix tables A3-16.<sup>32</sup>

In this chapter I begin by describing the determinants of giving to international causes, and then I compare these to the determinants of giving to other causes. Last, I briefly explore descriptive statistics for variables not included in regression analysis which offer interesting and relevant supplementary information.

### 4.2 Logistic Regression Analysis Results

#### The Determinants of International Giving

As predicted, education, religiosity, non-religious membership, and youth volunteering all have a significant, positive effect on giving to international causes. The only other variable that is significant in the regression is being Latino, which has a positive effect<sup>33</sup>. Notably, there is no significant association between giving to international causes and income, being an African-American, age, gender, the presence of children in the household, or living in the South.

Contrary to my expectations, non-religious membership and youth volunteering have a larger effect than both education and religion. The odds ratios suggest that those who are members

**Table 4.1 Logistic regression results for giving to particular causes**

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<sup>32</sup> Tables A.3-16 in the Appendix present the coefficients for all 14 causes in alphabetical order, including those that are analyzed in depth here. When there are interesting results in these latter seven regressions that are applicable to the main discussion here will I point these out in the text.

<sup>33</sup> An odds ratio greater than one corresponds to a coefficient with a positive sign while an odds ratio with a value of less than 1 corresponds to a coefficient with a negative sign..

	Int.	Arts	Edu.	Env.	Health	Relatives	Religion
Per capita income	1.023 (0.071)	1.209*** (0.049)	1.221*** (0.046)	1.093** (0.043)	1.128*** (0.043)	1.130*** (0.041)	1.066 (0.049)
Education	1.229** (0.099)	1.863*** (0.072)	1.353*** (0.056)	1.366*** (0.063)	1.157*** (0.052)	0.878** (0.050)	1.208*** (0.065)
Religiosity	1.360*** (0.094)	0.994 (0.061)	0.991 (0.047)	0.816*** (0.054)	1.041 (0.044)	0.928* (0.042)	3.371*** (0.061)
Non-religious membership	1.716** (0.217)	1.776*** (0.148)	1.468*** (0.121)	1.040 (0.139)	1.712*** (0.114)	1.265** (0.111)	1.044 (0.145)
Youth volunteering	1.843** (0.239)	1.659*** (0.161)	1.608*** (0.119)	1.284* (0.136)	1.441*** (0.109)	1.241** (0.103)	1.519*** (0.131)
Latino	1.793* (0.325)	0.710 (0.300)	1.027 (0.191)	0.491*** (0.267)	1.025 (0.181)	1.567*** (0.166)	1.090 (0.209)
African-American	0.902 (0.319)	1.310 (0.204)	0.990 (0.161)	0.359*** (0.244)	0.727** (0.153)	1.943*** (0.142)	0.664** (0.180)
Age	1.010 (0.007)	1.015*** (0.005)	1.003 (0.004)	1.005 (0.004)	1.028*** (0.004)	1.002 (0.003)	1.035*** (0.004)
Female	0.889 (0.211)	1.075 (0.149)	1.709*** (0.117)	1.629*** (0.136)	1.573*** (0.109)	1.293** (0.102)	0.738** (0.130)
Children in household	0.675 (0.251)	0.917 (0.166)	1.908*** (0.125)	0.766* (0.148)	0.892 (0.120)	0.901 (0.112)	0.694*** (0.141)
Southern	0.823 (0.215)	0.661*** (0.115)	1.139 (0.114)	0.819 (0.134)	1.005 (0.107)	1.299** (0.101)	0.997 (0.132)
Constant	0.009 (0.513)	0.011 (0.361)	0.053 (0.277)	0.105 (0.297)	0.060 (0.258)	0.509 (0.231)	0.031 (0.311)
N	2087	2086	2085	2085	2087	2080	2088
Nagelkerke's R <sup>2</sup>	0.082	0.229	0.148	0.114	0.147	0.042	0.462

Significant at one percent level \*\*\*, five percent \*\*, and ten percent \*

Notes: Due to space constraints, this table only shows odds ratios with standard errors in parentheses and significance levels. The coefficients are presented in the Appendix, Tables A3-16. The results are weighted to account for the data set's subsample of male and oversample of ethnic minority respondents. Observation sizes (N) differ slightly for giving groups because there are a few missing values for the dependent variables (i.e. some respondents did not answer or were not sure if they gave to the cause in question). The omitted categories are: not a member of a non-religious group; did not volunteer in youth; white; male; no children in the household; and Northeast, Midwest, and West. Source: Own calculations from Giving and Volunteering USA, 2001.

of a non-religious group are 71.6 percent more likely to give to international causes than those who are not members, and that those who volunteered in their youth are 84.3 percent more likely to give to international causes than those who didn't. In contrast, the odds ratios for religion and education suggest that, for every increase in the level of attendance at religious services, respondents are 36 percent more likely to give to international causes and for every increase in a respondent's level of education, he or she was 22.9 percent more likely to give.

These results will be discussed in more detail below, where they are compared to the results for other causes.

### 4.3 Comparative Analysis: The Determinants of Giving Across Causes

#### Income

The results suggest that income does not predict giving to international causes<sup>34</sup>. In contrast, giving to five of the six other causes (except religion) is significantly and positively associated with income. For every \$20,000 unit increase in income, the likelihood of giving to education increases by 22.1 percent, to the arts by 20.9 percent, to relatives by 13 percent, to health by 12.8 percent and to the environment by 9.3 percent<sup>35</sup>. High-paid graduates of educational institutions may feel gratitude, loyalty, and responsibility toward their alma mater. Wealthier people are more likely to afford expensive symphony tickets and museum memberships. Financially secure family members are more capable of giving than those who struggle to put food on their own tables. For international causes, while it is commonly held that giving is a luxury afforded by the super-rich, the data suggest a different story: there are other, more significant determinants associated with giving to international causes. Americans at all income levels may feel compelled to give to people who suffer extreme poverty in other countries. If religion does indeed motivate international charity, then as for religious giving, international giving may be less price-sensitive, more duty-bound than other causes.

Illustrating an unsurprising collinearity between education and income, the effect of income decreases with the inclusion of education in the model. This is true for donors to all causes except relatives, for whom the effect of income increased. Giving to relatives is negatively associated with higher levels of education, suggesting that even if donors are less educated, the more income they bring home, the more likely they are to give to relatives. The

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<sup>34</sup>Okten and Osili (2007) find that income *does* have an effect on giving to international causes. One possible explanation is that they compare international givers to all others in their sample population. This may mean that non-givers are included in their analysis. Because my study is on the determinants of giving to different causes, I do not include people who did not give. Those who give to international causes may have a significantly larger income than those who do not give at all, but no difference in income when compared to other givers. Another possibility is that the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, on which Okten and Osili base their work, provides more detailed information on income *and* other sources of wealth, and therefore equips them to test the effect of permanent rather than annual income on giving. Future primary research, which has the intent purpose of studying international philanthropy, should incorporate these considerations into its data design.

<sup>35</sup> Although not tested here, the effect of income on the *amount* that people give could vary by cause. An analysis of how much is donated and the percent of income donated are subjects for future research.



insignificance of income as a predictor for giving internationally is robust to sensitivity analysis.

## **Education**

As one's level of education increases, the likelihood of giving to international causes increases by 22.9 percent. Education affects giving to religion to a similar degree at 20.8 percent. On the opposite ends of the spectrum, a one unit increase in the level of education is associated with an 86.3 percent increase in the likelihood of giving to the arts, and a 12.2 percent *decrease* in giving to one's relatives (the only group with a negative association between education and giving). Clearly, education has the strongest effect on giving to the arts, but still a significantly large effect on giving internationally. Of the determinants tested, education is the strongest predictor for giving to the arts. For international giving, on the other hand, education ranks behind youth volunteering, non-religious membership, and religiosity in terms of the size of the effect. Therefore, in relative terms, educational institutions may more readily encourage people to identify with local causes - or simply provide them with access to and an appreciation of performing arts, ethnic heritage and the humanities - rather than with global humanitarian causes.

When education is entered into the regression model as a set of dummy variables instead of as one index variable, a similar picture emerges<sup>36</sup>. However, there are interesting details. Compared to people in the reference category who have less than a high school degree, those with "some college" are about one and a half times more likely to give internationally, and those with "some graduate or professional school" are almost four times more likely. Having "some graduate or professional school" increases the odds of giving to education and the environment by roughly three and four, respectively. The results also increase for giving to the arts, but by a factor of ten: those with post-graduate experience are about 30 times more likely to give. Overall, it is post-graduate experience that has the strongest effect on giving to international causes, the environment, education and the arts. While educational institutions in general may encourage people to cultivate their interests and concerns - and also to financially support the relevant charitable causes - graduate programs require a level of commitment to one's passions that may especially translate from the academic to the philanthropic sphere.

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<sup>36</sup> Because the results are largely the same, and because the alternate specification does not significantly change the effect of other variables, I choose the more parsimonious index for my fixed comparative regression model.

The effect of education on the likelihood of giving to international and other causes is robust to the inclusion of other variables. While the effect of education decreases when income is held constant, it does not change dramatically or lose its significance. Similarly, education loses a small amount of its effect when youth volunteering and non-religious membership are included in the model, yet the overall significance and direction of the effect are robust. Education is thus also positively correlated with past and present participation in one's community.

### **Religiosity**

Besides the large expected relationship with giving to religion, religiosity does not have a significant, *positive* effect on giving to any other cause except international programs. For every unit increase in attendance at religious services, the odds that a respondent gives internationally increase by 36 percent. Conversely, there is a negative and significant association between attendance at religious services and the likelihood that someone gives to the environment and to their relatives. Giving to one's relatives is slightly negatively associated with religiosity, but the relationship is not robust in sensitivity analysis. There is no significant effect on giving to the arts, education, or health.

To get a more detailed picture of the effect of religious attendance on giving, I tested an alternative specification where religiosity was included as a set of dummy variables<sup>37</sup>.

Attending "not at all" was the reference category compared to "only a few times a year; once or twice a month; and every week or nearly every week." Naturally, the likelihood of giving to religion increases at every level, with those who attend once or twice a month 16.4 times more likely to give, and those who attend nearly or every week 40.2 times more likely to give, than those who never attend. In this specification, the only significant effect of religiosity on international giving is for those who attend nearly or every week: they are 97.8 percent more likely to give. As an alternative specification, I recoded the religiosity variable as a dummy - where a score of '0' was assigned to those who attend never or, at most, a couple times a year, and a score of '1' was given to those who attend at least once a month. Respondents who go to religious services at least once a month are almost two and a half times more likely at the

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<sup>37</sup> For the same reasons as with education, I enter religiosity as an index variable in the comparative regression model.

one percent level of significance to give to international causes than those who rarely or never go to religious services.

The results suggest that there is a uniquely positive association between religiosity and giving to international causes. Do religious institutions influence regular service-goers to perceive their interests as co-determined with the interests of people who suffer from poverty and inequality in the developing world<sup>38</sup>? At the very least, religious institutions may take up special collections for associated causes, thereby compelling service-goers to incorporate the financial needs of people living in other countries into their own budgets. In contrast, the results seem to indicate that highly religious people are less likely to identify their interests with the environment. In the US, the religious right is notorious for approaching natural resources as God's unlimited gift to (hu)mankind. Thus, it is not surprising that those who attend services every week are about 40 percent less likely to give to the environment than those who never attend.

Two notable correlations between religiosity and other variables in the model become apparent when tested in sensitivity analysis. For religious and international donors, the effect of religiosity on their likelihood to give decreases by about 10 percent when youth volunteering is controlled for. Donors who frequently attend churches or temples, etc., may be the type of people who also volunteer. Another possible explanation is that, in their youth, donors who attended religious services with their families were encouraged to volunteer at religious functions. For international givers, there is a similar correlation between religiosity and non-religious membership. Among all causes, there are no apparent correlations between education and religion or income and religion, indicating that religiosity is not determined by financial and human capital in the US.

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<sup>38</sup> Another possibility is that especially spiritual and compassionate people - who are committed to doing what they can for people in the developing world - also tend to frequent religious services. In that case, a variable measuring kindness and care would clarify whether it is personality, and not necessarily religiosity, that leads people to give internationally (the classic problem of endogeneity in econometrics). Nonetheless, I rely on my hypothesis that while compassion and commitment demonstrate that a person identifies with others, these characteristics do not indicate where, how, or with whom a person learns to identify.

### **Non-religious Membership**

Non-religious membership is significantly and positively associated with giving to every cause except religion and the environment<sup>39</sup>. Compared to those who do not belong to any non-religious group, those who belong are 77.6 percent more likely to give to the arts, 71.6 percent more likely to give to international programs, 71.2 percent more likely to give to health, 46.8 percent more likely to give to education, and 26.5 percent more likely to give to relatives. The effect of non-religious membership on giving to the arts, international programs and health is similar. Because this variable provides no detailed information about the nature of that membership, it is difficult to say more than that non-religious membership appears to be an important contributing factor to prosocial behavior. Social capital increases the likelihood that people give to many different causes. As particularly social beings, people who actively participate in communities based on secular and mutual interests, hobbies, concerns, and/or commitments may simply be more likely to associate their own happiness and fulfillment with others' well-being.

The effect of non-religious group membership decreases somewhat when income and education are controlled for; this would be consistent with the assumption that donors who have the time to participate in and the access to a variety of secular organizations may have higher levels of education and income. The positive correlation is apparent for all groups except those who give to relatives, for whom the effect of non-religious membership increases when income and education are held constant. Given that Latino and African-American households are significantly more likely to give to relatives, the results reflect income and educational inequalities in the US.

### **Youth Volunteering**

Youth volunteering is significantly associated with giving to all causes, but to varying degrees. Of the causes on which I focus in this analysis, international giving is affected the most; respondents who volunteered under the age of 18 are 84.3 percent more likely to give to international programs compared to 65.9 percent for the arts, 60.8 percent for education, 51.9 percent for religion, 44.1 percent for health, 28.4 percent for the environment, and 24.1

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<sup>39</sup> Commitment to the environment may be driven more by personal convictions than group persuasions. Although environmentalism has become more mainstream since the data were collected, it was not long ago that individuals concerned with global warming and recycling, for instance, were commonly treated as suspect or "on the fringe" in public and private domains.

percent for giving to relatives. If youth volunteering does contribute to the development of - or is an expression of - an altruistic personality, then it may also be that people who give to international causes are especially likely to exhibit these attributes. Another explanation is that people who volunteered for youth 'mission trips' outside the US are much more likely to give internationally as adults. By traveling abroad to a location where they saw need, and at a formative stage in their lives, these individuals may be especially likely to identify their own emotional well-being with the well-being of poor people in other countries.

I also performed sensitivity analyses to identify collinearity with other key variables. Whereas for religious and international donors, the effect of youth volunteering decreases when religiosity is held constant, for people who give to the environment, the effect of youth volunteering increases by six percent: regardless of their attendance at religious services, people who volunteered in their youth may be more likely to give. When non-religious membership is held constant, on the other hand, the effect of youth volunteering decreases slightly, by about six percent, for all groups. Some possible explanations are that neighborly people who are oriented toward community involvement begin participating at an early age, or that prosocial experiences in youth have a lasting effect on a person's lifestyle.

When education is controlled for, the effect of youth volunteering decreases across causes between about five and ten percent. This is true for all causes except, again, giving to relatives. The picture that emerges in sensitivity analysis is that income, education, non-religious membership and youth volunteering are correlated in a complex and mutually reinforcing relationship. Despite collinearity, each individual variable maintains its overall significance and effect, showing that the variables do represent somewhat distinct kinds of capital which provide people with different resources and motivations for charity.

### **Race and Immigrant Status**

Using a set of categorical dummy variables with white as the reference category, I find that both African-American and Latino people are more likely to give to relatives (94.3 percent and 56.7 percent) and less likely to give to the environment (64.1 percent and 50.9 percent) than white people. These results are not surprising given that African-American and Latino cultures are generally recognized as being more oriented toward extended family networks

than white culture. On the other hand, environmentalism may come across as a special “green” interest, typically more associated with white culture *and* privilege - it could be considered a luxury to turn one’s financial concerns to non-human causes. African-Americans are also 27.3 percent less likely than whites to give to health and 33.6 percent less likely to give to religion. One possible explanation, implied by Musick, Wilson and Bynum (2000), is that volunteering may replace financial contributions for African-Americans. Predictably, the effect of being African-American or Latino on giving increases when income is held constant, reflecting income inequality in the US.

Because it is clear from the effect of race on giving that racial/ethnic background affects giving preferences and priorities, and because I assume that immigrants are especially likely to identify with international individuals and causes, I include “foreign born” into the regression model as an alternative specification. Holding all other factors constant, immigrants are almost four and a half times more likely than non-immigrants to give to international causes at the one percent level of significance. With the inclusion of ‘foreign born,’ the significance and effect of most other predictors remain constant. However the effect of non-religious membership increases by 14 percent and gains a level of significance such that international givers are 85 percent more likely than people who do not give abroad to be members of non-religious groups. This suggests that immigrants are less likely than native-born citizens to belong to secular organizations. The effect of being Latino on giving to international causes also changes when place of birth is held constant - its significance drops away and the odds ratio becomes close to one. The implication is that it is not necessarily being of Latino descent that increases the likelihood of giving internationally, but being born outside the US, in a Central or South American country or elsewhere.

Being born in or outside the US has no apparent association with giving to the arts, education, the environment, health, or religion. Nor does it affect the other predictors for these causes, except that the likelihood of giving to education increases for Latino people by nine percent, suggesting that US born people of Latino descent are more likely than immigrants to give formally to educational organizations.

Being foreign born does affect the likelihood that people give to their relatives. The results suggest that immigrants to the US are about 50 percent more likely than US-born citizens to give to family members at the five percent level of significance. Presumably, a significant portion of these contributions are remittances. As with giving to international organizations, when place of birth is held constant, the relationship between giving to relatives and being Latino drops in significance and loses 23 percent of its effect.

One possible explanation for these results is that Latino donors who give to family members and to international aid organizations are first generation immigrants who maintain ties with individuals and causes outside the US, presumably in their countries of origin<sup>40</sup>. As I find no statistical differences between Latino and white people in giving to the arts, education, health, and religion, I infer that, in due course, Latino immigrants and their children make donations to local US causes as well. Accordingly, Osili and Du (2005) find that immigrants assimilate quickly into philanthropic culture in the US, giving much like natives do to formal charitable organizations, as well as to family members in the US and in their country of origin.

## **Gender**

There are very clear divergences between the causes that men and women support. According to my analysis, women are 70.9 percent more likely than men to give to education, 62.9 percent more likely to give to the environment, 57.3 percent more likely to give to health, 29.3 percent more likely to give to relatives, and 26.2 percent *less* likely to give to religion than men. Women are more likely to give to more causes than men. As I predicted, however, gender has no significant effect on giving internationally. While women may give to education, health, and relatives - causes which largely attend to the needs of others, young and old - they may focus their efforts locally due to their concern for their immediate community, and/or for the potential positive externalities on their own families. Men, who are more likely to give to adult recreation, religion and political organizations, seem to support causes which align with their leisurely pursuits and/or ideological world-views. Therefore, while they may give to causes which they believe benefit humankind through the spreading of appropriate values and practices (i.e. through giving to religion and political organizations), this

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<sup>40</sup> About 14 percent of people who gave internationally and also to relatives sent money to relatives *outside* the US (remittances) - the largest proportion of any giving group. Only three percent of people who gave to the environment sent money to family in other countries. Roughly 12 percent of all people who gave to their relatives sent that money abroad (see Table A.17 in the Appendix).

motivation alone may not lead them to support international organizations that may or may not share their ideological position.

Not only are men more likely to give to religion, but they may also be more likely to attend services regularly: when religiosity is held constant, the effect of gender changes such that men become 32 percent more likely to give to religion than women at the five percent level of significance. Controlling for religiosity also moderates the effect of gender on giving to the environment: women become ten percent more likely to give.

### **Children**

The results suggest that the presence of children in the household does not have a statistically significant effect on giving to international causes, nor does it impact giving to health, relatives, or the arts. I predicted that parents may be more likely to empathize with people in the developing world who must watch their own children suffer from hunger and malnutrition. Alternatively, I suggested that donations to local children's causes may replace those that might otherwise go to children in developing countries. It is possible that these and other factors related to having children cancel each other out, or that the presence of children in a household *by itself* does not lead people to identify internationally.

There is, however, an effect on giving to other causes: respondents with children are 23.4 percent less likely to give to the environment, 69.4 percent more likely to give to religion, and 90.8 percent more likely to give to education. Parents who want their own and other children in their community to grow up with 'good values' and solid schooling are clearly motivated to give to religion and education. Conversely, while it seems that parents would be especially concerned about the environment for their descendants' sake, people who are concerned with the effect of population-growth on the environment may be more likely to make donations.

In sensitivity analysis, both age and religiosity moderate the effect that having children in the household has on giving, but in different capacities for different causes. When age is held constant, the effect of children increases for donors to education but decreases for the arts, indicating, of course, that people with children are younger, and that people of different ages



support different causes. When religiosity is controlled for, the effect of children on giving to the environment and religion becomes less negative and less positive, respectively. As the effect moves toward zero in both categories, there is an apparent correlation between going to religious services regularly and having children. However, this characteristic is apparently inconsequential for international donors for whom religiosity, but not the presence of children in the household, has an effect on giving.

## **Age**

For every year increase in age, respondents are 3.5 percent more likely to give to religion, 2.8 percent to health, and 1.5 percent to the arts. Because education and income are held constant in the regression model, changes in age may reflect differences in life experiences, values, and interests that occur as one ages. Naturally, when people retire, when their children grow up and leave the household, they have more time to pursue leisure and personal interests (reflected also by the collinearity between age and non-religious membership; see below). Their health also inevitably declines. This might inform their support for related charitable causes. As there is no statistically significant effect of age on international giving, it seems that accumulated experience does not as readily predict the growth of international concern as it does other considerations.

As expected, age is correlated with education, non-religious membership, and the presence of children in the household. The effect of age decreases when education and non-religious membership are held constant, indicating that the older people are, the higher level of education they have and the more likely it is that they belong to non-religious groups.

## **Region: Southern**

In the regressions, the region in which respondents live is usually not a significant predictor of whether or not they give to a particular cause, with a couple of exceptions. While there is no statistical relationship between giving to international causes and living in the South<sup>41</sup>, Southerners are 33.9 percent less likely to give to the arts and 29.9 percent more likely to give to relatives. Using an alternative specification with Northeast as the indicator and the other

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<sup>41</sup> The relationship is not robust to the inclusion of other factors, but people who give internationally are disproportionately represented in the West. About 25 percent of international donors live in the West, the largest of any giving group (see Table A.17 in the Appendix).

three regions - South, West, and Midwest - absorbed into one reference category, people who live in the Northeast are about 40 percent more likely to financially contribute to the arts. Given the stereotype of southerners as less sophisticated and 'cultured' than people from the Northeast and West, it seems fitting that they are less likely to give to theatre, literature, and cultural preservation groups. However, the South is also esteemed for its especially rich tradition of music, literature, food and spirituality, often associated with African-American culture. It may be that the way the question was posed - with "the arts, culture, and humanities" as a rather erudite classification - deterred people from identifying their donations as such. The positive association between living in the South and giving to relatives also fits with the image of southern culture as particularly personal and family-oriented.

Southern religiosity is another well-known American phenomenon, so I was surprised to find little effect on my results when I tested the effect of excluding the religion variable. The only notable effects are for giving to the environment and religion. Whereas it appears that southern respondents are about 20 percent less likely to give to the environment without religiosity controls, when religiosity is held constant, the significance of the effect disappears. Likewise, while southerners appear to be 33 percent more likely to give to religion than people living in the other three regions, when religiosity is held constant, the effect of living in the South loses its significance and drops all of its effect. The correlation implies that the American 'Bible Belt' persists.

## **4.2 Additional Correlates of Giving: Descriptive Analysis Results**

### **Introduction**

Although the variables on which I report in this section lack empirical or theoretical grounds for inclusion in the regression, their descriptive results augment the profile of international donors suggested by the regression analyses.

**Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics for particular causes**

	Arts	Education	Environ- ment	Health	Inter- national	Relatives	Religion
Percent of income donated (to all causes)	3.48 (.263)	3.26 (.179)	3.05 (.234)	3.11 (.157)	4.28 (.488)	2.68 (.145)	3.43 (.135)
Mean number of causes donated to	6.42 (0.149)	5.59 (.101)	5.64 (.143)	5.21 (.087)	6.62 (.253)	4.73 (.084)	4.35 (.070)
Donor has a bequest in his/her will	11.7 (4.5)	6.7 (1.3)	10.1 (3.6)	7.8 (2.6)	13.7 (3.8)	5.9 (0.4)	6.7 (1.7)
Donor itemizes deductions	62.6 (4.0)	55.4 (3.1)	51.1 (1.2)	52.7 (2.4)	65 (2.9)	47.7 (0.4)	50.3 (1.8)
N	2183						

*Notes: Standardized residuals - "the residuals of the model expressed in standard deviation units," and comparable to the standard error (Field 2005: 746) - are in parentheses. The data are weighted. Descriptive results for all causes are included in Table A.17 in the Appendix.*

*Source: Own calculations from Giving and Volunteering USA, 2001.*

### **International Donors Give Generously**

The descriptive statistics depict international donors as an especially generous and philanthropic group compared to donor groups for other causes. On average, those who give internationally give to 6.62 causes in total, the highest among giving groups. They are also the most likely to give to all the other focus group causes, except education (see Table A.18 in the Appendix for giving by cause). Not only do they give to a number of different causes, but they also incorporate their vast philanthropy into other personal financial considerations as well; international donors are the most likely to have a bequest to a charity in their will (i.e. they leave a portion of their wealth to a certain charity when they die), and they are the most likely to itemize deductions in their tax returns. Because itemization is a tedious process - in which the tax-payer claims his own list of deductions only if the total exceeds the standard deduction determined by the government for his income bracket - it is typically only practiced when a tax-payer determines it to be significantly worth his time to do so. The profile of international donors that emerges is one of philanthropic sophistication: they give a lot, yet know how to make giving work for them. They seem to be well-practiced at incorporating their own interests and the interests of charitable organizations (thus, the intended recipients, as well) into their philanthropic endeavors.

Furthermore, compared to other donor groups, international donors give on average the highest percent of their income to charity. The standard error is also the largest, and therefore the average is not as good a model as it is for other causes. Nonetheless, the international donor group includes people who give a relatively large percentage of their income to charity. Charitable 'generosity' has been the focus of much philanthropic research: what is it that causes some people to donate a larger percentage of their income than others? Research has suggested that low and high-income households give a larger percentage of their income to charity than middle-income households; however, Havens and Schervish (1995: 221) find that high levels of generosity are "mostly attributable to religious contributions and to a relatively small group of high-giving households at all income levels." As described by the regression results, religiosity is a uniquely significant predictor for international giving. Thus, international donors' generosity may be attributable to the behavioral and ideological commitments and values associated with religious practice, such as tithing, perceiving one's money as belonging to God, and using one's resources to serve others in need. Another possibility is that the unusually generous donors in the international giving group belong to Havens and Schervish's "small group of high-giving households at all income levels," for whom the determinants of charity are less understood, or less empirically observable.

## Conclusion

“Why do people give charitably” and “why do people give to particular causes” are two separate questions with different answers. Generally, people give because they are impure altruists who care about more than themselves and who get something out of giving. Specifically, they give money to struggling family members, old-growth forests in Alaska, or HIV/AIDS victims in the developing world because they identify especially with particular people and causes. There may be some very altruistic donors who give to all causes - or alternatively ‘neurotic’ donors who feel they must save the world - but most people identify with a few causes in particular. They do so based on experience, based on the specific environment in which they were raised, the people and causes to which they have been exposed, and the beliefs and world views they have adopted.

By econometrically analyzing observable data on the characteristics of individual donors, I have attempted to identify the mechanisms by which people identify with different causes. I was particularly interested in the effects of education and religiosity on giving, and more specifically in the effect of these and other predictor variables on giving to international causes. Insofar as international donations are designated for charities in the developing world, I have tried to sketch a profile of the private donor base in the US for development NGOs and programs, and to contribute to the conversation about private resource flows between the ‘North’ and ‘South.’ Who are the Americans who give some of their own money to ‘the needy’ in the developing world?

The results of my econometric analysis indicate that experiences such as volunteering in one’s youth, belonging to a non-religious group, participating actively in a religious community and having a four-year college degree or more are strongly associated with giving to international charitable organizations. These are common predictors of giving to many causes, but the size of their effect varies. Because I have attempted primarily to identify the divergent determinants of giving to different causes - i.e. what makes the donor base for international charities unique - the more interesting results are those that compare the effect of each variable on each cause. In contrast to the donor base for other causes, people who give internationally are especially likely to have volunteered in their youth, to belong to non-religious groups and to be religious. Contrary to my hypothesis, education was not

particularly associated with giving to international causes. While education - and especially graduate experience - may indeed increase the likelihood that people know about global issues, it seems that education is more readily associated with support for more non-humanitarian causes such as the arts, the environment, and education.

The effect of youth volunteering is largest for international donors, both compared to its effect on giving to other causes, and to the effect of the other variables on international giving.

There are many potential explanations for the association. It is possible that youth volunteering exposes people at a formative stage to the needs of others, thus developing their inclination to identify with and try to help people in need. The relationship would be especially strong if volunteering took place abroad or with an international organization based in the US. Another possibility is that the youth volunteering variable picks up other characteristics inherent in the type of person who gives internationally that my regression model does not include, such as concern for others who are less fortunate and personal generosity.

Belonging to a non-religious group is also an especially significant predictor for giving to international causes. Some non-religious groups such as Rotary or women's advocacy organizations may have a special focus on international understanding and assistance, thereby facilitating members' identification with international causes and individuals. Again, the variable may also pick up unobservable characteristics not in the regression model: perhaps people who actively participate in their local communities are, by their disposition, more concerned with and committed to the welfare of others, both locally and globally.

Although its affect on giving is less significant than youth volunteering and non-religious membership, religiosity is uniquely associated with giving to international causes. Among all 14 causes (except religion), donors in the international charitable group are singularly distinguished by their high level of religiosity. Many religious texts and traditions teach believers to identify with, practice compassion for, and serve people in need. Considering the level of suffering and need in the developing world caused by poverty and inequality, religious institutions may especially encourage believers to direct their efforts toward relevant charitable causes. Another possibility is that, in keeping with the missionary tradition of

Christianity in poor countries, religious Americans achieve two purposes with their support of international donations: helping ‘the needy’ and attending to their spiritual ‘salvation.’ Or, as I have suggested in Chapter Four, the type of person who gives to international charities, regardless of his or her other commitments, is also the type of person who tends to frequent religious services.

International donors share a less common determinant with people who give to relatives: being born outside the US. Clearly, people who have lived in other countries are aware of and concerned about life outside the US. Immigrants may bring passion and valuable insight about life in other countries - especially developing countries - to their new communities and to the organizations they support with their donations.

Future research that is tailored to the purpose of studying the factors that influence international giving is needed. There are many variables that may affect people’s knowledge of and therefore identification with international causes that were not available in the data used in this study, such as travel abroad and watching the news. Both quantitative analysis of the determinants of giving and qualitative inquiry about their operation in society would be fruitful. In my opinion, the apparent relationship between religiosity and international giving warrants a special focus. Just as the US government’s Official Development Assistance is tied to an agenda that demonstrates US interests, private aid presumably bears the principles and provisos of the people who supply it. For instance, one of President Obama’s first acts in office was to reverse the contentious “Mexico City Policy” that forbade government funding to international organizations which provide abortions or information about abortions, known also as the ‘global gag rule’ (New York Times 2009). Anti-abortion groups that criticized Obama’s decision have a large constituency in the religious right. Religious doctrines which inform these groups may similarly restrict private support for development organizations that advocate methods for the prevention of HIV/AIDS and pregnancy other than abstinence. Again, more research is needed to understand the implications. As religion is an especially sensitive subject, a ‘scientific’ approach to its influence on international giving would be beneficial. By studying these and other factors which shape charitable motivations, we may better understand the public will for redistribution to the developing world.

**Table A.1 Survey questions and cause definitions**

Cause	Survey Question
Adult Recreation	In 2000, did you and members of your household contribute money or property to or for adult recreation? Examples include swimming, boating, skiing, or hunting clubs.
Arts, Culture, and Humanities	(In 2000, ...for) arts, culture, and humanities? Examples include performing arts, cultural or ethnic groups, museums, art exhibits, and public television or radio.
Education	(In 2000, ...for) education? Examples include elementary schools, secondary or higher education (public or private), and libraries.
Environment	(In 2000, ...for) the environment, including animal welfare? Examples include the SPCA, and programs for environmental quality and beautification.
Foundations	(In 2000, ...for) private and community foundations? Examples include the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and local foundations.
Health	(In 2000, ...for) health? Examples include hospitals, mental health organizations, nursing homes, hospices, clinics, and the American Cancer Society.
Human Services	(In 2000, ...for) human services? For example, daycare, foster care, family counseling, consumer protection, homelessness, job services, the Red Cross, the YMCA, and charity drives like the United Way.
Individuals (non-family)	(In 2000, ...for) friends, neighbors, or strangers?
International	(In 2000, ...for) international or foreign programs, either in the U.S. or abroad? Examples include relief abroad and student or cultural exchange programs.
Political	(In 2000, ...for) political organizations and campaigns? Examples include political parties, nonpartisan political groups, and community groups.
Public/Societal Benefit	(In 2000, ...for) public or societal benefit? Examples include civil rights, minority and women's equity issues, community or social action, Rotary, and Kiwanis.
Relatives	(In 2000, ...for) relatives who don't live with you, including children and parents?
Religion	(In 2000, ...for) religious organizations? Examples include churches, synagogues, convents, seminaries, and mosques.
Youth Development	(In 2000, ...for) youth development? Examples include the Boys and Girl Scouts, 4-H Clubs, and Little Leagues.

*Notes: The value labels are No (0) and Yes (1). This section of the interview began as follows: "Now we're going to talk about charitable giving. I'm going to read you examples of the many different areas in which households contribute money or other property for charitable purposes. By contributing, I mean making a voluntary contribution with no intention of making a profit. For each area, please tell me whether you or the members of your household contributed some money or other property in 2000." If asked, the interviewer was instructed to add, "Please include payroll deductions."*

*Source: The Independent Sector, Giving and Volunteering 2001*



**Table A.2 Mean characteristics and proportions for charity selectors**

Independent Variable	Mean	Independent Variable	Mean
Income	30,563 (635.466)	Non-Religious	0.33 (0.011)
<b>Education level:</b> Less than high school graduate	11.6 (0.007)	Membership	0.59 (0.011)
High school graduate	32.3 (0.010)	Youth Volunteer	0.10 (0.007)
Some technical, trade, or business school/college	27.7 (0.010)	Latino	0.15 (0.008)
Four-year college degree (BA, BS)	19.2 (0.009)	African-American	0.79 (0.009)
Some graduate school (MA, MS, Ph.D.)	9.0 (0.006)	White	47.60 (0.397)
<b>Attendance at religious services:</b> Not at all	23.3 (0.009)	Age	0.61 (0.011)
Only a few times a year	23.2 (0.009)	Gender (female)	0.37 (0.011)
Once or twice a month	12 (0.007)	Presence of Children in Household	0.39 (0.011)
Every week or nearly every week	41.2 (0.011)	Region (Southern)	2183 (0.011)
		Total Observations	

Notes: The results are weighted. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Source: Own Calculations from Giving and Volunteering USA, 2001.

**Table A.3 Logistic regression results for adult recreation**

	Coefficient B	Standard Error	Odds Ratio Exp(B)
Per-capita income	0.006	(0.067)	1.006
Education	0.149	(0.098)	1.161
Religiosity	-0.037	(0.084)	0.964
Non-religious group membership	0.499**	(0.214)	1.647
Youth volunteering	0.221	(0.219)	1.247
Latino	-0.082	(0.348)	0.921
African-American	-0.331	(0.324)	0.718
Age	0.003	(0.007)	1.003
Gender (female)	-0.566***	(0.202)	0.568
Children in household	0.386*	(0.224)	1.471
Southern	-0.334	(0.218)	0.716
Constant	-3.087***	(0.470)	0.046
N	2087		
Nagelkerke's R <sup>2</sup>	0.046		

Notes: (Applicable to Tables A.3-16. Significant at one percent level \*\*\*, five percent \*\*, and ten percent\*. The results are weighted to account for the data set's subsample of male and oversample of ethnic minority respondents. The sample includes only "charity selectors." The reference category for non-religious group membership is no membership in a non-religious group; for youth volunteering, no experience in youth as a volunteer; for race, white; or gender, male; for children in the household, no children in household; and for region, the three other US regions - Northeast, Midwest, and West.

Source: Own calculations of Giving and Volunteering 2001, USA.

**Table A.4 Logistic regression results for arts, culture, and humanities**

	<b>Coefficient B</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>Odds Ratio Exp(B)</b>
Per-capita income	0.190***	(0.049)	1.209
Education	0.622***	(0.072)	1.863
Religiosity	-0.006	(0.061)	0.994
Non-religious GROUP membership	0.574***	(0.148)	1.776
Youth volunteering	0.506***	(0.161)	1.659
Latino	-0.342	(0.300)	0.710
African-American	0.271	(0.204)	1.310
Age	0.015***	(0.005)	1.015
Gender (female)	0.072	(0.149)	1.075
Children in household	-0.086	(0.166)	0.917
Southern	-0.415***	(0.155)	0.661
Constant	-4.510***	(0.361)	0.011
N	2086		
Nagelkerke's R <sup>2</sup>	0.229		

*Significant at one percent level \*\*\*, five percent \*\*, and ten percent \**

**Table A.5 Logistic regression results for education**

	<b>Coefficient B</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>Odds Ratio Exp(B)</b>
Per-capita income	0.200***	(0.046)	1.221
Education	0.302***	(0.056)	1.353
Religiosity	-0.009	(0.047)	0.991
Non-religious group membership	0.384***	(0.121)	1.468
Youth volunteering	0.475***	(0.119)	1.608
Latino	0.027	(0.191)	1.027
African-American	-0.010	(0.161)	0.990
Age	0.003	(0.004)	1.003
Gender (female)	0.536***	(0.117)	1.709
Children in household	0.646***	(0.125)	1.908
Southern	0.130	(0.114)	1.139
Constant	-2.946***	(0.277)	0.053
N	2085		
Nagelkerke's R <sup>2</sup>	0.148		

*Significant at one percent level \*\*\*, five percent \*\*, and ten percent \**

**Table A.6 Logistic regression results for the environment**

	<b>Coefficient B</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>Odds Ratio Exp(B)</b>
Per-capita income	0.089**	(0.043)	1.093
Education	0.312***	(0.063)	1.366
Religiosity	-0.203***	(0.054)	0.816
Non-religious group membership	0.039	(0.139)	1.040
Youth volunteering	0.250*	(0.136)	1.284
Latino	-0.712***	(0.267)	0.491
African-American	-1.023***	(0.244)	0.359
Age	0.005	(0.004)	1.005
Gender (female)	0.488***	(0.136)	1.629
Children in household	-0.267*	(0.148)	0.766
Southern	-0.199	(0.134)	0.819
Constant	-2.257***	(0.297)	0.105
N	2085		
Nagelkerke's R <sup>2</sup>	0.114		

*Significant at one percent level \*\*\*, five percent \*\*, and ten percent \**

**Table A.7 Logistic regression results for health**

	<b>Coefficient B</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>Odds Ratio Exp(B)</b>
Per-capita income	0.121***	(0.043)	1.128
Education	0.145***	(0.052)	1.157
Religiosity	0.040	(0.044)	1.041
Non-religious group membership	0.538***	(0.114)	1.712
Youth volunteering	0.366***	(0.109)	1.441
Latino	0.025	(0.181)	1.025
African-American	-0.318**	(0.153)	0.727
Age	0.027***	(0.004)	1.028
Gender (female)	0.453***	(0.109)	1.573
Children in household	-0.114	(0.120)	0.892
Southern	0.005	(0.107)	1.005
Constant	-2.818***	(0.258)	0.060
N	2087		
Nagelkerke's R <sup>2</sup>	0.147		

*Significant at one percent level \*\*\*, five percent \*\*, and ten percent \**

**Table A.8 Logistic regression results for human services**

	<b>Coefficient B</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>Odds Ratio Exp(B)</b>
Per-capita income	0.103**	(0.042)	1.108
Education	0.181***	(0.051)	1.198
Religiosity	-0.072*	(0.043)	0.931
Non-religious group membership	0.556***	(0.112)	1.743
Youth volunteering	0.269**	(0.107)	1.308
Latino	0.088	(0.175)	1.092
African-American	-0.109	(0.150)	0.897
Age	0.007**	(0.003)	1.007
Gender (female)	-0.009	(0.105)	0.991
Children in household	0.079	(0.117)	1.082
Southern	0.150	(0.105)	1.162
Constant	-1.635***	(0.243)	0.195
N	2081		
Nagelkerke's R <sup>2</sup>	0.074		

*Significant at one percent level \*\*\*, five percent \*\*, and ten percent \**

**Table A.9 Logistic regression results for international/foreign causes**

	<b>Coefficient B</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>Odds Ratio Exp(B)</b>
Per-capita income	0.023	(0.071)	1.023
Education	0.206**	(0.099)	1.229
Religiosity	0.307***	(0.094)	1.360
Non-religious group membership	0.540**	(0.217)	1.716
Youth volunteering	0.611**	(0.239)	1.843
Latino	0.584*	(0.325)	1.793
African-American	-0.104	(0.319)	0.902
Age	0.010	(0.007)	1.010
Gender (female)	-0.118	(0.211)	0.889
Children in household	-0.393	(0.251)	0.675
Southern	-0.195	(0.215)	0.823
Constant	-4.698***	(0.513)	0.009
N	2087		
Nagelkerke's R <sup>2</sup>	0.082		

*Significant at one percent level \*\*\*, five percent \*\*, and ten percent \**

**Table A.10 Logistic regression results for non-family individuals**

	<b>Coefficient B</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>Odds Ratio Exp(B)</b>
Per-capita income	0.027	(0.040)	1.027
Education	0.084	(0.054)	1.088
Religiosity	-0.022	(0.046)	0.978
Non-religious group membership	0.200*	(0.120)	1.222
Youth volunteering	0.345***	(0.115)	1.412
Latino	-0.079	(0.185)	0.924
African-American	0.510***	(0.147)	1.665
Age	-0.020***	(0.004)	0.980
Gender (female)	-0.011	(0.110)	0.989
Children in household	-0.106	(0.119)	0.899
Southern	0.093	(0.110)	1.098
Constant	-0.402	(0.247)	0.669
N	2081		
Nagelkerke's R <sup>2</sup>	0.064		

*Significant at one percent level \*\*\*, five percent \*\*, and ten percent \**

**Table A.11 Logistic regression results for political organizations**

	<b>Coefficient B</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>Odds Ratio Exp(B)</b>
Per-capita income	0.137***	(0.049)	1.147
Education	0.179**	(0.072)	1.196
Religiosity	0.056	(0.064)	1.058
Non-religious group membership	0.624***	(0.158)	1.867
Youth volunteering	0.776***	(0.173)	2.173
Latino	0.039	(0.283)	1.040
African-American	-0.256	(0.239)	0.774
Age	0.034***	(0.005)	1.035
Gender (female)	-0.591***	(0.153)	0.554
Children in household	0.115	(0.184)	1.122
Southern	-0.012	(0.158)	0.988
Constant	-4.784***	(0.390)	0.008
N	2085		
Nagelkerke's R <sup>2</sup>	0.157		

*Significant at one percent level \*\*\*, five percent \*\*, and ten percent \**

**Table A.12 Logistic regression results for private and community foundations**

	<b>Coefficient B</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>Odds Ratio Exp(b)</b>
Per-capita income	0.034	(0.058)	1.035
Education	0.168**	(0.085)	1.183
Religiosity	0.053	(0.075)	1.054
Non-religious group membership	0.221	(0.188)	1.247
Youth volunteering	0.598***	(0.199)	1.818
Latino	0.312	(0.294)	1.366
African-American	0.062	(0.257)	1.063
Age	0.011**	(0.006)	1.011
Gender (female)	-0.012	(0.181)	0.988
Children in household	-0.188	(0.207)	0.829
Southern	-0.137	(0.183)	0.872
Constant	-3.812***	(0.425)	0.022
N	2086		
Nagelkerke's R <sup>2</sup>	0.041		

*Significant at one percent level \*\*\*, five percent \*\*, and ten percent \**

**Table A.13 Logistic regression results for public/societal benefit**

	<b>Coefficient B</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>Odds Ratio Exp(b)</b>
Per-capita income	0.085*	(0.047)	1.089
Education	0.355***	(0.077)	1.426
Religiosity	-0.197***	(0.067)	0.821
Non-religious group membership	0.509***	(0.166)	1.663
Youth volunteering	0.553***	(0.178)	1.738
Latino	0.369	(0.270)	1.447
African-American	0.247	(0.225)	1.280
Age	0.010*	(0.005)	1.010
Gender (female)	0.159	(0.163)	1.172
Children in household	-0.093	(0.181)	0.912
Southern	-0.079	(0.165)	0.924
Constant	-3.773***	(0.379)	0.023
N	2083		
Nagelkerke's R <sup>2</sup>	0.100		

*Significant at one percent level \*\*\*, five percent \*\*, and ten percent \**

**Table A.14 Logistic regression results for relatives**

	<b>Coefficient B</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>Odds Ratio Exp(B)</b>
Per-capita income	0.122***	(0.041)	1.130
Education	-0.130**	(0.050)	0.878
Religiosity	-0.075*	(0.042)	0.928
Non-religious group membership	0.235**	(0.111)	1.265
Youth volunteering	0.216**	(0.103)	1.241
Latino	0.449***	(0.166)	1.567
African-American	0.664***	(0.142)	1.943
Age	0.002	(0.003)	1.002
Gender (female)	0.257**	(0.102)	1.293
Children in household	-0.105	(0.112)	0.901
Southern	0.262**	(0.101)	1.299
Constant	-0.676***	(0.231)	0.509
N	2080		
Nagelkerke's R <sup>2</sup>	0.042		

*Significant at one percent level \*\*\*, five percent \*\*, and ten percent \**

**Table A.15 Logistic regression results for religion**

	<b>Coefficient B</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>Odds Ratio Exp(B)</b>
Per-capita income	0.064	(0.049)	1.066
Education	0.189***	(0.065)	1.208
Religiosity	1.215***	(0.061)	3.371
Non-religious group membership	0.043	(0.145)	1.044
Youth volunteering	0.418***	(0.131)	1.519
Latino	0.086	(0.209)	1.090
African-American	-0.409**	(0.180)	0.644
Age	0.034***	(0.004)	1.035
Gender (female)	-0.304**	(0.130)	0.738
Children in household	0.527***	(0.141)	1.694
Southern	-0.003	(0.132)	0.997
Constant	-3.464***	(0.311)	0.031
N	2088		
Nagelkerke's R <sup>2</sup>	0.462		

*Significant at one percent level \*\*\*, five percent \*\*, and ten percent \**

**Table A.16 Logistic regression results for youth development**

	<b>Coefficient B</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>Odds Ratio Exp(B)</b>
Per-capita income	0.149***	(0.043)	1.161
Education	0.108**	(0.052)	1.114
Religiosity	-0.135***	(0.044)	0.874
Non-religious group membership	0.549***	(0.114)	1.731
Youth volunteering	0.507***	(0.110)	1.660
Latino	-0.089	(0.180)	0.915
African-American	-0.045	(0.152)	0.956
Age	0.004	(0.004)	1.004
Gender (female)	0.166	(0.107)	1.181
Children in household	0.521***	(0.118)	1.683
Southern	-0.071	(0.107)	0.931
Constant	-1.732***	(0.248)	0.177
N	2083		
Nagelkerke's R <sup>2</sup>	0.099		

*Significant at one percent level \*\*\*, five percent \*\*, and ten percent \**



**Table A.17 Descriptive statistics for all causes (means and proportions)**

	Arts	Edu.	Env.	Health	Int.	Family	Religion	Adult Rec.	Found.	Human Services	(Non-family) Ind.	Political	Pub/Soc Benefit	Youth Dev.
Percent of income donated (to all causes)	3.48 (0.263)	3.26 (0.179)	3.05 (0.234)	3.11 (0.157)	4.28 (.488)	2.68 (0.145)	3.43 (0.135)	3.84 (0.465)	3.51 (0.365)	3.07 (0.168)	3.00 (0.181)	3.55 (0.293)	3.72 (0.338)	2.99 (0.164)
Mean number of causes donated to	6.42 (.149)	5.59 (.101)	5.64 (.143)	5.21 (.087)	6.62 (.253)	4.73 (.084)	4.35 (.070)	6.03 (.258)	5.93 (.240)	5.25 (.094)	5.28 (.104)	6.33 (.166)	6.39 (.189)	5.25 (.092)
Donor has a bequest in will	11.7 (4.5)	6.7 (1.3)	10.1 (3.6)	7.8 (2.6)	13.7 (3.8)	5.9 (0.4)	6.7 (1.7)	6.0 (0.2)	12.8 (3.9)	8.4 (3.2)	7.9 (2.4)	13.8 (5.4)	11.5 (3.7)	6.8 (1.4)
Donor itemizes deductions	62.6 (4.0)	55.4 (3.1)	51.1 (1.2)	52.7 (2.4)	65 (2.9)	47.7 (0.4)	50.3 (1.8)	52.5 (0.9)	60.3 (2.5)	54.9 (3.2)	45.9 (-0.2)	60.4 (3.1)	57.4 (2.3)	55.2 (3.2)
<b>Resides in:</b>														
Northeast	22.6 (2.5)	16.5 (0)	21.3 (2.2)	18.1 (1.0)	17.1 (0.1)	15 (-1.2)	16.3 (-0.3)	17.9 (0.4)	18.7 (0.6)	15.7 (-0.6)	15.5 (-0.7)	15.5 (-0.4)	14.6 (-0.7)	16.9 (0.1)
West	23 (1.9)	21.3 (1.6)	18.8 (0.2)	16.9 (-0.9)	24.8 (1.6)	18.5 (0)	16.5 (-1.5)	23.1 (1.2)	21.9 (1.0)	19.4 (0.6)	20.4 (1.1)	23.1 (1.7)	21.8 (1.2)	20.1 (1.0)
South	30.7 (-2.4)	40.1 (0.3)	33.0 (-1.9)	38.3 (-0.5)	35 (-0.8)	42.5 (1.4)	41.1 (0.9)	31.6 (-1.3)	36.8 (-0.5)	39.7 (0.2)	40.9 (0.6)	35.7 (-0.9)	35 (-1.0)	36.3 (-1.2)
Midwest	23.6 (-.7)	22.2 (-1.6)	27 (0.5)	26.6 (0.6)	23.1 (0.-5)	24 (-0.8)	26.1 (0.4)	27.4 (0.4)	22.6 (-0.7)	25 (-0.2)	23.2 (-1.1)	25.6 (0)	28.6 (0.9)	26.7 (0.5)
Donor sends money to relatives outside the US	4.7 (-.3)	5.5 (0.3)	3.1 (-1.7)	4.6 (-0.6)	13.7 (4.1)	11.5 (8.1)	5.1 (-0.1)	3.4 (-0.8)	5.1 (0)	5.3 (0.1)	7.4 (2.5)	4.6 (-0.4)	5.3 (0.1)	4.0 (-1.3)

*Notes: Statistics are for charity selectors, only. Standardized residuals are in parentheses.*

*Source: Own calculations of Giving and Volunteering USA, 2001.*

**Table A.18 Descriptives: proportion of donors in each giving group that give to each cause**

	Arts	Edu.	Env.	Health	Int.	Relat.	Relig.	A. Rec.	Found.	H. Ser.	Nf. Ind.	Pol.	PS Ben.	Y. Dev.
Arts		29.7 (8.2)	31.8 (7.6)	23.3 (5.1)	38.5 (6.1)	18.6 (1.9)	17.6 (1.5)	31.4 (4.2)	26.9 (3.4)	24.7 (5.8)	21.6 (3.4)	33.5 (6.8)	35.9 (7.3)	22.8 (4.5)
Education	56.6 (8.2)		40.2 (3.4)	37.4 (3.6)	45.3 (3.0)	35.6 (2.7)	33.0 (1.8)	50 (3.9)	43.6 (3.0)	39.3 (4.4)	39.2 (3.8)	46.2 (4.5)	48.8 (4.9)	47.4 (8.1)
Environment	38.3 (7.6)	25.4 (3.4)		26.6 (4.7)	38.8 (4.9)	19.4 (0.3)	18.0 (-0.8)	30.5 (2.8)	25.6 (1.9)	24.1 (3.1)	23.9 (2.6)	32.6 (4.8)	34.4 (5.1)	24.0 (3.0)
Health	58.9 (5.1)	49.8 (3.6)	56 (4.7)		59.8 (3.3)	43.8 (1.6)	45.2 (2.7)	47.5 (1.2)	54.5 (2.8)	53.7 (5.6)	47.2 (2.6)	60.7 (5.0)	57.3 (3.9)	50.7 (4.3)
International	15.2 (6.1)	9.4 (3.0)	12.7 (4.9)	9.3 (3.3)		7.4 (1.4)	8.2 (2.7)	9.3 (1.3)	12.8 (3.3)	10.4 (4.3)	8.5 (2.1)	10.8 (2.8)	14.8 (5.0)	7.4 (1.2)
Relatives	52.2 (1.9)	52.6 (2.7)	45.9 (0.3)	48.6 (1.6)	53.4 (1.4)		45.3 (0.2)	49.6 (0.8)	55.1 (1.9)	50.2 (2.2)	60.7 (5.6)	52.7 (1.8)	53.1 (1.8)	48.9 (1.6)
Religion	70.4 (1.5)	69.4 (1.8)	60.1 (-0.8)	71.2 (2.7)	83.8 (2.7)	64.3 (0.2)		70.9 (1.0)	66.0 (0.4)	66.3 (1.0)	65 (0.5)	76.2 (2.5)	68.3 (0.9)	65.5 (0.7)
Adult Recreation	12.5 (4.2)	10.4 (3.9)	10.1 (2.8)	7.4 (1.2)	9.4 (1.3)	7.0 (0.8)	7.0 (1.0)		10.3 (2.0)	7.8 (1.6)	7.0 (0.7)	13.4 (4.4)	8.6 (1.3)	10.0 (3.9)
Foundations	14.1 (3.4)	12 (3.0)	11.3 (1.9)	11.3 (2.8)	17.1 (3.3)	10.3 (1.9)	8.7 (0.4)	13.7 (2.0)		11.4 (2.7)	11.9 (2.8)	13.3 (2.7)	17.2 (4.4)	9.9 (1.4)
Human Services	58.6 (5.8)	49 (4.4)	47.7 (3.1)	50.4 (5.6)	62.4 (4.3)	42.5 (2.2)	39.5 (1.0)	46.6 (1.6)	51.3 (2.7)		45.5 (3.0)	52.5 (3.7)	54.3 (3.9)	49.6 (5.0)
(Non-family) Individuals	40.5 (3.4)	38.7 (3.8)	37.3 (2.6)	35.1 (2.6)	40.5 (2.1)	40.3 (5.6)	30.6 (0.5)	33.3 (0.7)	42.3 (2.8)	36.1 (3.0)		39.6 (2.8)	43.5 (3.6)	35.8 (2.8)

	Arts	Edu.	Env.	Health	Int.	Relat.	Relig.	A. Rec.	Found.	H. Ser.	Nf. Ind.	Pol.	PS Ben.	Y. Dev.
Politics	26.9 (6.8)	19.5 (4.5)	22 (4.8)	19.3 (5.0)	22.2 (2.8)	15.1 (1.8)	15.3 (2.5)	27.1 (4.4)	20.5 (2.7)	17.8 (3.7)	17.1 (2.8)		30.1 (7.0)	19.1 (4.5)
Public/Societal Benefit	25.4 (7.3)	18 (4.9)	20.3 (5.1)	15.8 (3.9)	26.5 (5.0)	13.3 (1.8)	12.0 (0.9)	15.3 (1.3)	23.1 (4.4)	16.1 (3.9)	16.4 (3.6)	26.4 (7.0)		15.7 (3.5)
Youth Development	52 (4.5)	56.7 (8.1)	45.6 (3.0)	45.6 (4.3)	42.7 (1.2)	39.7 (1.6)	37.4 (0.7)	57.6 (3.9)	42.9 (1.4)	47.5 (5.0)	43.4 (2.8)	54.0 (4.5)	50.7 (3.5)	

*Notes: Statistics are for charity selectors, only. Standardized residuals are in parentheses. Columns represent giving groups (e.g..column one indicates that 52% of people who gave to the arts gave to youth development.*

*Source: Own calculations of Giving and Volunteering USA, 2001.*

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